A More Detailed Look at Rasbach’s Book

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Here are my detailed, page by page, comments on Rasbach’s book.

This is one of the thorniest projects I’ve ever had to deal with in the realm of CW research and writing.  Trying to follow what I see as faulty logic and convoluted reasoning made this review of Dennis Rasbach’s book an extremely painful experience for me.  Piling additional faulty assertions upon an original faulty and unsubstantiated premise makes for a torturous venture into what I consider pseudo-history.  It has meant chasing down supposedly new and/or allegedly relevant sources, such as articles in urology journals and a treatise on artillery trajectory.  I’ve pursued, read and evaluated every source given, except for one obscure source insufficiently cited, and so, unreachable.  If it is of the same reliability and/or relevance as the other “new” sources, I am not overly concerned that we’re missing anything vital.  The following is my best effort to try to address what I see as the worst or most glaring of Rasbach’s errors.
Dennis Rasbach, in his book Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain and the Petersburg Campaign; His Supposed Charge from Fort Hell, his Near-Mortal Wound, and a Civil War Myth Reconsidered, seems to be trying to pick a fight with me, Diane Monroe Smith, the military historian who wrote Chamberlain at Petersburg: The Charge at Fort Hell.  While I consider myself, because of my research and writing, to be uniquely qualified to respond to Rasbach, I also point out that what he’s actually up against is a much more formidable opponent, Gen. Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, for the backbone of my book is a previously unpublished manuscript by Chamberlain himself regarding his and his brigade’s role in the battle of Petersburg, June 18, 1864.  My job was to preface Chamberlain’s Petersburg chronicle with a view of the bloody weeks of Grant’s Overland Campaign that led the 5th Corps and the Army of the Potomac’s to their confrontation with Lee’s ANV at Petersburg.  Then, supplemented with extensive primary source material… numerous other participants’ testimony, the official record, period maps, etc…. we gave Chamberlain’s account a thorough annotation, augmenting the Chamberlain evidence with that of the many whose experience touched upon his own that day.  While Rasbach tries to infer that my research and writing is based solely on Chamberlain’s accounts, accounts that Rasbach rejects out of hand, I’ll ask the reader to refer to my book with its thorough annotation and lengthy bibliography to put paid to that accusation. I’ll also add that, having considered Chamberlain material and his writings for more than 20 years, I have come to believe Chamberlain was a careful and honest historian, who frequently consulted his fellow veterans, both Union and Confederate.  So, let us consider, in detail, Rasbach’s challenge to Chamberlain’s intelligence and veracity.
The first casualty in Rasbach’s campaign, seemingly, is common sense. Let’s start with his primary theory, that Joshua Chamberlain did not know where he and his brigade fought on June 18, 1864, despite the fact that it was Chamberlain who led the brigade to the position where the assault began, Chamberlain who coordinated and led the attack in person, and Chamberlain who later described it very clearly.  We’ll be examining in detail the evidence Rasbach offers to, not only deny that Chamberlain fought at Rives’ Salient, the location that Chamberlain and others have identified, but he insists that they fought 1.5 miles away on the Union right at the future site of the notorious Crater. But Rasbach’s complete disregard for and disparagement of Chamberlain testimony, and all those who agree with Chamberlain for that matter, is not the only occurrence of what are, in my opinion, unsubstantiated, nonsensical conclusions.  Consider these points:
– Since Rasbach insists on placing Chamberlain and his Brigade at the future site of the Crater, where on earth does Rasbach think the 9th Corps fought that day?  Whatever your opinions of the veteran commanders Gens. Burnside and Warren, why would they cram two brigades (Sweitzer’s & Chamberlain’s), a division (Crawford’s) and a whole corps (the 9th Corps) in that very confined area, while leaving the rest of the enemy’s battle line to the left largely ignored and dangerously uncontested?  Also, would Meade have been blind to this inexplicable pig pile on his front line?  The map [p. 85] that reflects Rasbach’s theories shows the Federal units stacking up like dominoes, and hold on, …Cutler’s Division seems to be headed to the Crater site, too!  In order to give Rasbach’s theories any merit, one would, in my opinion, have to completely disregard the evidence of who did fight at the future site of the Crater.
-Another of Rasbach’s points that seems unreasonable is his supposition that anyone, let alone Joshua Chamberlain (a bright lad), could mistake the formidable fortifications of the original Dimmock line, like Rives’ Salient and Fort Mahone, for whatever earthworks the Rebels had thrown together upon their falling back in the early hours of June 18th.  Rasbach also discards Chamberlain’s description of, upon revisiting the battlefield, pinpointing his position by considering and lining up the well-remembered church steeples on Petersburg’s horizon.  Rasbach inexplicably claims that the perspective from where he says Chamberlain fought, 1.5 miles to the Federal right, looks the same as that viewed from Rives’ Salient!  I also found Rasbach’s comment that Chamberlain, on his return to Petersburg in the 1880s, returned as a “casual tourist” quite offensive.  It’s impossible for me to imagine that any commander who lost a good part of his command in a pointless attack on that field, and came near losing his own life, would seek out that terrible battleground with anything less than his attention sharpened by the remembered tragedy of June 18, 1864.  But Rasbach makes more detours from common sense.
-Rasbach insists that Chamberlain consulted no one regarding June 18th for two decades, nor apparently, gave it any thought, for Rasbach suggests that Chamberlain didn’t write about it until he was a confused, forgetful old man.  This is ignoring the fact that Chamberlain, wounded but alert enough to write a very moving and coherent letter to his wife from the field hospital on June 18th, was visited that night by a number of 5th Corps commanders, who most certainly spoke with him about the attack and its aftermath.  Then too, Chamberlain, though barely able, was back with the 5th Corps at Petersburg by October, 1864, serving again with the men and officers of the AoP with whom he made the attack.  Additionally, as Rasbach knows, in 1865, Chamberlain sent out many “circulars” soliciting witness statements from the participants in preparation for a 5th Corps history he intended to write. [We know that Rasbach is aware of JLC’s “circulars” for he cites the designated response to one of them in this book]  Becoming Governor of Maine, then President of Bowdoin College, sidetracked his 5th Corps project, but for the rest of his life, Chamberlain had an extensive correspondence with veterans, Federal and Confederate.  In fact, I discovered Chamberlain’s lost ms., “The Charge at Fort Hell,” at Duke while searching for Chamberlain’s correspondence with Gen. Thomas Munford.  Also, Chamberlain’s membership in many Veterans’ societies and his great popularity as a speaker at their meetings makes Rasbach’s assertion that Chamberlain didn’t bother to speak with anyone seem silly.
One more point before we dive into a detailed consideration of Rasbach’s book:  Why on earth would Rasbach take up such campaign against a number of well-established facts?  It’s rather the prime directive that every historian goes where the evidence leads you, but in Rasbach’s case it’s my opinion that other considerations may have influenced his “findings” on his first experience in Civil War research.  Rasbach has stated that his interest in the subject began with his discovery that one of his ancestors served in the Civil War. Further investigation probably proved disappointing for Rasbach, for his ancestor’s cavalry unit, the 21st Pennsylvania, hadn’t arrived at the front until June 2nd, 1864 and the unit had been stripped of all 1,250 of their horses as well as their equipment by U.S. Grant, whose commander of cavalry, Philip Sheridan, was using and loosing horses and equipment at an alarming rate. [O.B. Knowles to JLC, Dec 15, 1865, Joshua L Chamberlain Collection, Library of Congress]  On further investigation, Rasbach would also have realized that his great great grandfather was not only transformed suddenly from dashing trooper to untrained infantryman overnight, but also had had the misfortune of being assigned to a lackluster 2nd brigade in the 1st division, 5th Corps, Army of the Potomac. Two of of that brigade’s commanders, Gen. Jacob Sweitzer and Col. Tilton, had not covered themselves with glory, at Gettysburg or elsewhere, and the latter apparently had little affection for Joshua Chamberlain, who had made such a name for himself at Little Round Top, that his corps commander, Gen. Gouverneur Warren and division commander, Gen. Charles Griffin, saw that Chamberlain was promoted to brigade commander over Tilton’s head despite the latter’s seniority.  Tilton’s military service saw sporadic periods of a rise to brigade command, only to be returned to command of his regiment, the 22nd Massachusetts.  There are other indications that all may not have been well within Sweitzer’s Brigade, for a number of units were approaching the end of their service, with one regiment, the 4th Michigan, due to be mustered out June 19th!  On the day of the battle, June 18th, part of the 4th Michigan indicated their willingness to fight, while others deserted. [Bertera, Martin; The 4th Michigan Infantry in the Civil War, East Lansing, Michigan State University Press, 2010, pp 225-227]
Therefore, Rasbach’s acknowledgement that he was much influenced and inspired to write his book by a report by Col. Tilton is significant, for that report regarding Chamberlain and the 1st Brigade’s fight at Rives’ Salient is a confused and misleading document.  While Tilton in no way disputes the location of Chamberlain’s assault, he so muddies the waters as to who led the 3 p.m. attack, Tilton or Chamberlain (it was Chamberlain), and obscures the details of whether or not the 2nd brigade supported the 1st Brigade’s 3 p.m. attack as ordered (they did not). But there is another possibility for why Rasbach may have taken up this strange crusade, and it is a puzzling situation that poses as many questions as it answers.  Rasbach acknowledges how much he was influenced by his researcher, Bryce Suderow.  Suderow contributed supplementary material (sidebars, maps, etc.) to Ed Bearrs’ book, The Petersburg Campaign (2 vols.), including a map on p. 114, v. I, created by George Skoch.  The map is apparently drawn to specifications provided by Suderow, for no other resource is cited and nothing in Bearrs’ text suggests or supports these much revised positions. The map inexplicably shows something very similar to Rasbach’s “Chamberlain at the Crater” scenario, and leaves one wondering if this was the first murmurings of what has grown into, at least in Rasbach and Suderow’s minds, this “Chamberlain didn’t know where he was” theory.
To give credit where credit is due, I’m relieved to see see that Rasbach thought better of embracing the erroneous pre-publication press releases issued by his research assistant, Bryce Suderow, who insisted that Chamberlain hadn’t returned to Petersburg until decades after June 18,1864.  Chamberlain had, in fact, though his wound was imperfectly healed, returned to the Army of the Potomac just months after his fight at Rives Salient.  Chamberlain was quick to point out that he was a goodly distance from his June. 18th battlefield, for he was assigned to a position with the 5th Corps on the AoP’s far left, and a visit to Ft. Hell, the redoubt that engineer Washington Roebling had designed, would have provided little opportunity for “sight seeing,” for  raising one’s head above the parapet of that hot spot on the lines would have been inviting a quick death courtesy of the Rebel sharpshooters.  But is it conceivable that when Chamberlain returned to the 5th Corps, thereby rejoining the very same officers and men who fought with him on June 18th, that there didn’t occur some very animated discussions as to the details of that sanguine day?
In this introduction, I’ve initially considered only the points that I feel most clearly fly in the face of common sense.  There are a number of other issues I want to consider here, ones I took up in my review of Rasbach’s book on my author website, dianemonroesmith.com.  There is also a newspaper interview (“Q & A”) where I answered questions about the differences between Mr. Rasbach’s research and conclusions and my own. So what follows here, after careful consideration of all Rasbach’s writings and every one of his sources, is a full and detailed assessment, point by point, considering in every case their accuracy, relevance and reliability.  While I suspect that only the most dedicated students of Chamberlain’s life and letters will feel compelled to wade through this response to Rasbach’s assertions, I hope that my consideration of and reaction to Rasbach’s book will be of service in developing a fair and better understanding of a remarkable individual, and it will clarify and reveal the real history of Chamberlain and his brigade at the Battle of Petersburg, June 18, 1864.  Rasbach inexplicably claims that his lack of experience as a historian and the short amount of time it took him to assemble his evidence and write his book is somehow an asset or an advantage.  I can only respond that I take no pleasure in seeing someone get in over their head, but neither will I allow unsubstantiated or faulty research to replace the fully documented, well-reasoned evidence that exists regarding Chamberlain’s attack at Rives’ Salient.    Here are my notes on Dennis Rasbach’s Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain and the Petersburg Campaign: His Supposed Charge from Fort Hell, his Near-Mortal Wound, and a Civil War Myth Reconsidered. [Wow!  What a title!]
Introduction and First Chapter.
On considering Dennis Rasbach’s book, it does not take very long [introduction and first chapter, in fact] to realize that Rasbach does not, in my opinion, have a firm grasp of his subject and how it should be presented to insure the reader of the integrity and relevance of his evidence.  Rasbach’s initial sally, that of describing Chamberlain’s advance on the morning of June 18, 1864, filled me with foreboding, for a quick glance at the bottom of the page foretold that this might be one of many Savas Beatie efforts that feels no particular responsibility to provide the reader with citations.  [I once asked Ted Savas on the Bull Runnings blog why so many of his books had no footnotes, endnotes or bibliographies, and he replied that it saved money, and his authors were all experts anyway!]  If one believes, as I do, that the historian has the obligation to provide adequate information for the reader to access the author’s research material and consider it for themselves, you may be in for the same disappointment I had, for you may not find them here. To continue, with nary a citation, Rasbach makes the casual statement in his text that he is describing Chamberlain’s advance on the morning of June 18th, 1864 as based on JLC’s own accounts and those of his biographers. Yet he has, apparently, chosen to ignore or discount all other available evidence regarding the advance [See Chamberlain at Petersburg, pp. 42-44, 48-58, 102, 106-107] In an apparently serious confusion of what Chamberlain attacked, as well as where he attacked from, Rasbach presents a staggeringly confused and misleading description in which, to Rasbach’s way of thinking, JLC claimed to have attacked the enemy at the future site of Fort Sedgwick, eventually known as Ft. Hell on the Union line.  No one, to my knowledge, except Rasbach, thought or thinks that the Rebels’ main line on June 18th occupied any part of the rather extensive area that became known as Ft. Hell.   Rasbach further muddies the waters by describing Chamberlain as then advancing along the Jerusalem Plank Rd., while no one, except, to my knowledge, but Rasbach, has ever tried to place the 1st Brigade as moving along the Jerusalem Plank Rd.  So, in spite of Rasbach’s claims that his idea of Chamberlain’s advance on the morning of June 18th comes right from Chamberlain and his biographers, no one I know of, certainly not Chamberlain and certainly not this biographer, agrees with him.  We are given no citations for just what Chamberlain documents or which biographers Rasbach mined to come up with his version of the 1st Brigade’s advance, but having a thorough working knowledge of the existing Chamberlain testimony and biographical works, this simply doesn’t stand up.  Instead of the all important sources for Rasbach’s unusual claims, we are instead offered a generic discussion of Confederate Forts and an undated map of the Petersburg battlefield that seemingly and inexplicably disproves, rather than proves, Rasbach’s own revisionist theories of troop placement.  We are also given a lengthy history of how Rives’ Salient got its name.
Why is the description of Chamberlain’s fighting approach to Rives’ Salient important?  Because Dennis Rasbach is setting out to prove that Chamberlain did not know where he was, did not know where he attacked, and could not tell the difference between the original fortifications on the Dimmock line, (the likes of which cowed several West Point trained attackers- namely Gens. Quincy Gillmore & Baldy Smith), as opposed to the holes in the ground and low earthworks that the Rebels had been able to throw together, madly digging in between 1 a.m. and noon on June 18.  When Rasbach does get around to considering other Petersburg historians, he gets lost in the paper chase, though admittedly, it is a complex one.  Rasbach, for instance, refers to Thomas Howe’s [Wasted Valor, 1988] assertion that Chamberlain’s right flank was actually in that all important landmark of the battlefield, the railroad cut of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad.  While Howe cites Chamberlain, Rasbach cites Howe, and seemingly mistakes Howe’s statements of his own opinions for Chamberlain’s testimony.  Instead of assessing JLC’s actual evidence himself, which stated that he had a deep railroad cut on his right, Rasbach’s chooses to accept Howe’s interpretation of JLC’s statement as meaning JLC’s right was on or “in” the railroad cut.  It should be pointed out that Chamberlain was more than a little aware of and worried about that deep railroad cut on his right, for should he or the artillery he had had brought up have to withdraw, they’d be in big trouble.   On the off chance that the other citation Howe does offer as his evidence of this claim is of greater merit, we go to the Southern Historical Society Papers.  They don’t deliver the goods either, so we check the SHSP’s citation, which was Coppee’s Grant & His Campaigns [not Larke’s by the same title].  Not only did the SHSP article not substantiate Howe’s claim, on the page prior to the cited page, there’s a lovely map that agrees with JLC’s placement of the 5th Corps on the afternoon of June 18, 1864.
We’re not even out of Rasbach’s introduction yet, folks!  But we’ll soldier on in our investigation of Rasbach’s assertions that no one attacked at Rives’ Salient on June 18, 1864- not Chamberlain, not anybody, according to Rasbach.  We are again reminded of Rasbach’s premise that Chamberlain did not know where he was on the battlefield.  While stating that JLC was instead 1.5 miles to the right of his stated position, Rasbach also claims that JLC mistook the low earthworks that the Rebels were able to throw up on the morning of June 18th for the formidable fortifications of at Rives’ Salient and the adjoining batteries at Fort Mahone of Petersburg’s Dimmock Line, built over the course of two years.  Rasbach’s Chapter Title is “Smoke, Clouds, and Confusion: The Pitfalls of Embellishing Clouded Hindsight.”  Rasbach accuses JLC of producing faulty or self-aggrandizing accounts, while charging the Chamberlain historians of the late 20th century and early 21st century of creative embellishment.  That must include me! Fanny and Joshua, 1999, and Chamberlain at Petersburg, 2004]

Pp. 1-2
Here Rasbach inexplicably insists that Chamberlain did not return to Petersburg until 1882, when, in fact, Chamberlain, though insufficiently recovered from his June 18th, 1864 wound, was back at the Petersburg front by early November 1864. Later in his book, Rasbach gets a bit closer to the facts when he admits that Chamberlain was back at Petersburg by January 1865-  So this later admission contradicts his initial statement of never having returned for decades.  Without explanation, Rasbach disregards Chamberlain’s very detailed description of his position before his 3 p.m. assault, his letter protesting an order to attack identified as “Lines before Petersburg, June 18th, 1864” as reprinted in a newspaper article, Lewiston Evening Journal, Sept 1-6, 1900.  Once Rasbach has unaccountably discarded this evidence, he then states that aside from that evidence, “we do not have any record of specific comments by Chamberlain concerning his whereabouts at Petersburg on June 18, 1864, for a span of nearly two decades after the engagement.”  Again ignoring the fact that Chamberlain was back with the Army of the Potomac in the fall of 1864 and from January to April 1865, Rasbach fastens upon a letter Chamberlain wrote to his sister after revisiting Petersburg in 1882, and how JLC found the battlefield much changed.  In Rasbach’s mind, this proves that JLC found the battleground “unfamiliar.”  Rasbach finds fault with Chamberlain using topographical features such as the railroad cut and the “well remembered direction of the church spires of the city” in order to pinpoint the position of his assault and near fatal wounding. Rasbach is critical that Chamberlain “resorted to using” these features to orient himself, but what else on earth would he use but the remaining landmarks of the battlefield?  Rasbach seems to think that because the church steeples in Petersburg’s horizon were two miles from Rives’ Salient this would make their use as landmarks unreliable.  Here Rasbach also insists that the Chamberlain’s perspective of the Petersburg church steeples would look exactly the same if viewed from a mile an a half to the right where Rasbach insists Chamberlains assault took place at the future site of the Crater.  Rasbach offers both Chamberlain’s admission that the battlefield was much changed, and his disbelief that the perspective from Rives’ Salient would look any different from what would be viewed from the Crater as proof that Chamberlain was mistaken about where he and the First Brigade attacked on June 18th.  I don’t accept his evidence or reasoning as valid, and I can’t agree.

Pp. 7-11
While mocking that Chamberlain’s “spellbinding tale so enraptured his interviewer that the journalist lapsed into poetic expression of profound admiration,”  Rasbach attempts to task JLC with seeming discrepancies in the article.  But as Rasbach has pointed out, it’s worth remembering that the “The Hero of Gettysburg,” was not written by Chamberlain, but by a reporter after an interview.
Rasbach’s utilizes Chamberlain’s admission in his “Reminiscences” [See Chamberlain at Petersburg, pp. 78-92] that he didn’t remember things clearly after his wounding, Rasbach doesn’t seem to appreciate the importance of JLC statement that he made up for that by gathering information from other participants and witnesses to get details of the battle after he was shot and carried from the field.  After calling JLC’s powers of memory into question, Rasbach offers a contrary statement that Chamberlain’s “recall was not entirely confused.  His memory seems both vivid and reliable in terms of what he was able to remember about the nature of the terrain, the directions of his movements, and the substance of his conversations with other officers.” Considering that Rasbach is about to spend the rest of his book trying to make out that JLC was mistaken, forgetful, confused and possibly untrustworthy, I just don’t know what to make of this puzzling tribute and endorsement of Chamberlain’s powers of recall.  For by Rasbach’s p. 10, he’s declaring that Chamberlain accounts conflict with one another and those of other participants, and Rasbach proclaims that “Chamberlain’s own false premise conceived the myth that has come down to us,” a myth Rasbach states has been perpetuated by a long line of biographers, a line I can only assume includes me, the author of Fanny and Joshua, a 400+ page biography of Joshua and Fanny Chamberlain, and Chamberlain at Petersburg.
I admit that Rasbach’s pronouncements on p. 9 blew my mind.  Rasbach likened Chamberlain’s return to the Petersburg battlefield in 1882 to “more one of a spectator and casual sightseer than that of a researcher, scholar, or detective.”  We’ve all heard of doctors who insulate themselves with “sang froid,” but that anyone could describe a veteran with Chamberlain’s intelligence and experiences as a “casual tourist” when he returned to the site of one of the great crises of his military career is beyond my understanding.  For Chamberlain this was the place where he must decide whether of not to lead his men into what he knew would be a futile, costly attack that left 314 of his men killed, wounded or missing, and nearly took his own life.  It is where he received a wound that left a dark cloud over the rest of his life.  How anyone could imagine that JLC walked over those fields as a “casual tourist,” is an inexplicably callous assessment by Rasbach.  And if Chamberlain, a man who spoke 6 languages, taught all courses except mathematics at the prestigious Bowdoin College, as well as serving as its President, isn’t enough of a “scholar” for Rasbach, I’d like to know who is?
I do doubt that Rasbach considered my Chamberlain biography, for if he had, he might have noticed the countless citations that show JLC to be a careful and honest researcher and historian, who constantly consulted other witnesses, included his Rebel opponents in order to consider their viewpoints and recollections on many a field.  In fact, I (me, the detective) discovered  JLC’s unpublished ms. “The Charge at Fort Hell,” that forms the backbone of my book, Chamberlain at Petersburg, while searching for correspondence JLC had had with Gen. Thomas Munford.  I didn’t find the correspondence, but the wonderful librarian at Duke’s special collection casually mentioned they had a JLC ms..  The fact that it had never been published is not attributable to what  Rasbach implies as it having been forgotten through sheer disinterest, but actually a case of no one knowing it was there.  The library itself has no idea how they acquired it.
In spite of the fact that Rasbach’s own citations are, in places, mighty thin, Rasbach also criticizes Chamberlain for not providing citations in this draft battle memoir “The Charge at Fort Hell,” nor for his speeches or a newspaper interview.  This is not only an unjustified criticism,  but kind of silly, for I know of no cases where speakers provide foot or end notes for their orations, nor do military memoirists usually feel the need to give citations, especially in a first draft.  Why, in fact, would a person need to footnote their own recollections?  Nor would newspaper articles or personal letters provide such things.
While Rasbach often professes respect for Chamberlain and his record, it seems to me that he often implies just the opposite.  In this case Rasbach comments that, “The explicit pronouncements made by Chamberlain concerning his role in the attack at Petersburg were made many decades after the event.  The ranks of Civil War survivors were thinning.  Veterans, understandably, wanted to find a way to immortalize their deeds of valor so history would not forget them.”  Does that sound to you, as it does to me, that Rasbach is insinuating that Chamberlain waited until most of the other participants were dead, and then inflated or exaggerated his role so he wouldn’t be forgotten.  It seems to me, that with observations like this, Rasbach has announced himself to be a member of the “I’m going to take Chamberlain down a peg” club.

Pp. 12-13
Rasbach comments that Chamberlain penned his book, Passing of the Armies 50 years after the battle of Petersburg, apparently, while on his deathbed.  Though it is true that JLC was preparing the final draft of his book for publication just before his death.  Rasbach, though he mentions them, at times seems to forget Chamberlain’s “circulars” which JLC sent out immediately after the war soliciting veteran’s testimony for a history of the 5th Corps he hoped to write.  So Chamberlain, far from waiting until he was on his deathbed like Grant, had been researching and writing about his wartime experiences starting in the weeks when he returned to Maine in 1865.

P. 13
Rasbach comments that Chamberlain penned his book, Passing of the Armies 50 years after the battle of Petersburg, apparently, while on his deathbed.  Though it is true that JLC was preparing the final draft of his book for publication just before his death.  Rasbach, though he writes of them, at times seems to forget Chamberlain’s “circulars” which JLC sent out soliciting veteran’s testimony for a history of the 5th Corps he hoped to write. So Chamberlain, far from waiting until he was on his deathbed like Grant, had been researching and writing about his wartime experiences starting in the weeks when he returned to Maine in 1865.

P. 14
Rasbach mistakes JLC’s expression of concern about the RR cut to his and his batteries’ right and rear [one which would prevent their withdrawal if the Rebels launched an attack] for a declaration that his right was actually on or in the RR cut.  At 3 p.m., as Chamberlain clearly states, he was in front of Rives Salient, with Bigelow’s 9th Mass. Battery right behind him… not next to the railroad cut or even near it.  One disturbing element of Rasbach’s work is a seemingly consistent disregard of works that don’t agree with his theories.  A case in point is a remarkable work by Chief Ranger Eric A. Campbell, a 28 year veteran of the National Park Service, with 23 of those years doing battle interpretation at Gettysburg.  Historian Campbell is the author of “A Grand and Terrible Dramma,” which presents the letters of 9th Mass. Battery veteran.  Under entries and annotation for June 18th [p.212],  Campbell notes, while citing the Baker’s history of the 9th Battery, that the batteries movement was “made in support of the assault made by Brig. Gen. Joshua Chamberlain’s [sic: JLC was actually a colonel at the time] brigade against Rives’ Salient.”  One can assume that Chief Ranger Campbell was satisfied (as I was) with the testimony of the 9th Mass. Battery historian and Chamberlain regarding the location of the 3 p.m. assault.  Did Rasbach not find this important evidence by a respected and experience historian, or did he choose to disregard it?                                                                                                                                                                         It is also interesting to note that Chamberlain did express concern about his exposed left flank, but not his right, for even though there was a substantial gap between JLC and Sweitzer, there was swampy ground [unoccupied by Sweitzer or anyone else] that Chamberlain was confident would discourage and prevent the Rebels from attacking his right flank.  Also on p. 14, Rasbach lists all the things he disagrees with Trulock over, citing Trulock and only Trulock.  Rasbach does not then tell us what his “alternative facts” are, or offer any citation or hint of proof of what he is basing his disagreements upon.  Rasbach does make clear his disagreement with Trulock’s estimate that Chamberlain’s brigade’s two battle lines for his 3 p.m. attack were a quarter of a mile in length.  But he does expect us to accept his theory that 6 Federal divisions were crammed into a front 1.5 miles long around the future site of the Crater.  I have no wish to argue with Rasbach that Sweitzer, in a position on Crawford’s left, was closer to the 9th Corps than he was to Chamberlain, but I believe it is clear that there was a big gap between Chamberlain and Sweitzer, and Rasbach does not.  Therefore, we’ll be carefully examining his and all available evidence.

P.15                                                                                                                                                                      Since Rasbach insists that Chamberlain was on Sweitzer’s immediate left flank, and since Sweitzer was over with Crawford and the 9th Corps, Rasbach therefore insists that we concur that Chamberlain was over by the Crater as well. while, once again, it seems very clear that a substantial gap existed between Sweitzer and Chamberlain.  Rasbach inexplicably offers a secondary source, Matthew’s 1994 unit history of the149th Pa., as evidence of where Rasbach believes Gen. Ayres was.  Everyone other than Rasbach has Ayers on the 5th Corps’ extreme left on or near the Jerusalem Plank Rd. on the afternoon of June 18.  Rasbach also suggests that Ayers’ 11:45 a.m. report from Rives’ Salient, is proof that Ayers, not Chamberlain, was at Rives at 3 p.m.  Where Ayers was at 11:45 on the morning of June 18th in no way proves where he was at 3 p.m.. Personally, I found Matthews to be confused in some matters, for he seems to have gotten the details of Chamberlain’s morning advance during his attempt to capture the enemy’s field battery [when his horse was shot out from under him], tangled up with the 1st Brigade’s 3 p.m. assault [which Chamberlain and his whole staff made on foot].

Pp. 16-17                                                                                                     The map on p. 16 is all but illegible, even with a magnifying glass.  I notice here, too that although I had previously thought that Rasbach only named three Chamberlain author by name that he disagreed with, I missed Rasbach naming Mark Nesbitt.  So instead of it being just Diane [me], Susan and Alice, it’s Diane, Susan, Alice and Mark.  On page 17, Rasbach apparently thinks it necessary to point out to us that Chamberlain did not have the post-war map [Chamberlain collection, LC] upon which, after the war, JLC marked his position and the positions of all the Federal and Confederate troops with him at the time of the battle. Rasbach suggests that JLC had a map [What map would that be?  I don’t think JLC did.], but it’s not, of course, the one at the Library of Congress that Chamberlain marked after the war.  Rasbach apparently feels that this somehow invalidates Chamberlain’s identifying marks.  Here Rasbach also implies that my research and writing is based solely upon Chamberlain’s testimony or other Chamberlain historians who were gullible enough to take Chamberlain’s word.  I’ll refer the reader once again to my book, Chamberlain at Petersburg, its extensive footnotes, endnotes, and bibliography, as evidence for the many sources other than Chamberlain that I consulted.  Even the maps, that my husband, CW author Ned Smith, did for the book have sources noted for the research used to create the maps.

P.18                                                                                                              Rasbach comments that “Smith’s extensive annotation of ‘The Charge at Fort Hell’ include specific details (such as directions, distances, and place name) that are missing in the original accounts.”  I suggest that that is the purpose of annotation, to carefully supply the reader with additional information that is not in the original text.  I prefer to place the additional information in the footnote or endnote where it is clearly an addition by the annotator.  I object to Rasbach’s inclusion of his annotation directly in the quote.  While he has set them off with brackets, I fear it is too likely to be considered as part of the original text, and in cases where the information supplied is incorrect, it makes a nonsense of both the quote and the annotation, and provides only misleading disservice. [See my note below for Rasbach’s p. 20 for a case in point].  Rasbach, I believe, makes it quite clear here that, since other JLC biographers only devoted a few pages to June 18th, it is my book that he is refuting.  Rasbach also inserts the word “[which]” into a quotation from my book which I didn’t need.  Apparently Rasbach disagrees with my grammar as well as my research and writing.

Pp.20-21                                                                                                       In the middle of a direct quotation from JLC’s manuscript, “The Charge at Fort Hell,” Rasbach inserts his own opinion of where Chamberlain was.   Chamberlain wrote, “I moved up close in rear of the guns….” at which point Rasbach adds “[which were in the open field northwest of the Avery house, towards the Taylor property].”  Rasbach cites only JLC for evidence at this point, and since Chamberlain did not name the batteries he was called upon to defend, we’ve only Rasbach’s word for it.  Rasbach then makes the most unwarranted assumption that the batteries Chamberlain was ordered to defend must be the batteries that were assigned to Griffin’s 1st Division.  Citing Wainwright’s description of which batteries were assigned to and accompanying which divisions at dawn, does nothing to prove who those batteries were with and where they ended up throughout the morning and afternoon. Things don’t work that way.  It is often the case that whoever is nearest or not engaged is the one who is going to get the job.  A case in point would be Bigelow’s unattached battery ending up supporting Chamberlain’s Brigade the afternoon of June 18th. To assume that the batteries JLC was defending the morning had to be one of those assigned to Griffin is to risk making a critical mistake.  Rasbach doubles down on identifying what batteries JLC was defending in his map on p. 30.  Rasbach closes this chapter with the comment that, while Chamberlain was ordered to dispose of the enemy battery, he did not have a mandate to “make an end run around the 4th and 2nd divisions [Cutler and Ayers] on the left flank of the Army, or to assault, alone, from the south to Rives’ Salient.” Since no one, not JLC or any historian I’m aware of has made a claim that Chamberlain ran off to the 5th Corps’ extreme left or desired to, Rasbach’s assertion is a moot point. Perhaps if Rasbach had considered Chamberlain’s request to Griffin that he be allowed to handle the situation in his own way, Rasbach would have positioned himself to get the right end of the stick, and make sense of the details.

Pp. 27-31                                                                                                 I find this statement by Rasbach misleading: “When Warren rode forward early on the morning of June 18th, he found that the Confederates had fallen back once again during the night….”  It implies that Warren himself discovered that the Rebels had fallen back, which is far from the case.  Warren only rode forward to the Avery house where he established his headquarters. The only citation Rasbach offers for this statement is David Lowe’s Meade’s Army [p. 212], which confirms only Warren’s advance to the Avery house, and while Lowe’s work is interesting, it is mighty stingy with its citations, which are also presented in such an eccentric fashion that one can’t hope to follow them to where the sources can actually be found and checked. You also have to be extremely vigilant in noticing where direct quotes begin and end, in order to be aware of when Lowe’s opinions get plugged in among quotations.  Then, too, there are inexplicable errors.  Case in point, p. 450, endnote 5, in which Lowe, citing OR vol. 40, I, pp. 455-456, states that Sweitzer, on June 18th “went in” on Chamberlain’s left, while the cited OR clearly states Sweitzer was on JLC’s right. But anyway, Lowe [p.213], for what it’s worth, confirms that it was Sweitzer’s 22nd Mass. which was attempting to protect Phillips’ Battery, not Chamberlain’s brigade as Rasbach insists.  Again, I point out that we do not know with any certainty which batteries JLC was called upon to defend.  Rasbach insists that it was Phillips, Stewart’s and Richardson’s, and he confidently marks them on his map with “These Batteries Here,” but offers no proof.  Phillips’ report [Supplement or Addendum OR, pt. I, v. 7, pp. 229-230], while quite concise in its description of its movements on June 18th, mentions only acting in concert with Sweitzer, with no mention of Chamberlain. Meanwhile, according to Rasbach’s own map, Bigelow’s, Hart’s & Barnes’ Batteries, the ones that ended up with Chamberlain at Rives Salient on the afternoon of June 18, remained, according to Rasbach’s own map to the rear and closer to the Avery house and RR cut. Jespersen’s map was created, we assume, from the material Rasbach provided for him, since no other sources are cited.  Then, too, the map has no directional compass, despite references to direction in Rasbach’s text, and states no time, an omission which makes the information it is supposedly offering irrelevant.  Nor does the map show the Tatum property, a landmark which Rasbach refers to in his text.  Rasbach, in the caption for the map, admits that the batteries moved during the day, but insists that they all stayed by the Baxter Rd.
Here, too, Rasbach again insists on disputing whether or not Chamberlain could have been on the Jerusalem Plank Rd., a claim neither JLC nor anybody else has made, and Rasbach also suggest that if JLC had been on the Jerusalem Plank Rd, he would have been violating his orders.  The only possible explanation I can come up with as to why Rasbach insists on questioning whether Chamberlain was on the Jerusalem Plank Rd. on June 18th is that Rasbach’s understanding of the future Ft. Hell’s location is a mistaken belief that it merely straddled the Jerusalem Plank Rd., while ignoring the fact that Ft. Hell’s eventual footprint was huge.  It did indeed straddle that road, but it also extended well eastward to the area opposite Rives’ Salient.        Phew… we’re not done yet.      I also disagree completely that the advanced Rebel battery that Chamberlain was sent to dislodge was, as Rasbach and Jespersen’s map proclaims, up near Pegram’s Salient.  The only reason I can come up with as to why Rasbach should place it there is so that it coincide with and bring into agreement his theory that Chamberlain was following the Phillips/Stewart/Richardson contingent, and therefore any enemy fire on Chamberlain’s left had to come from a Rebel battery crammed into a tight corner between two creeks and a railroad cut… a position, I suggest, any smart battery would avoid, since any Federal sally across the cut, the very moves the 5th Corps were getting underway, would leave the Rebel guns and their crews utterly trapped.  Rasbach’s p. 30 map also seems to indicate that the advanced Rebel battery and Phillips’, Stewart’s and Richardson’s were slugging it out with the advanced Rebel battery seemingly at point blank range from opposite sides of the railroad cut, a drama that does not fit the descriptions of the fire the Confederates were inflicting on the 5th Corps!
There is also the all important matter of where the 9th Corps fought on June 18. How many accounts do we need?  See Earl Hess’s In the Trenches at Peterburg, p. 33, a book, by the way, listed in Rasbach’s bibliography.  It seems clear, unlike on Rasbach’s map, that Willcox and Hartranft fought directly in front of Pegram’s or Elliott’s Salient.  Crawford’s brigade was not north of the Taylor house but south of it, and it clearly was not opposite Pegram’s Salient.

Pp. 33-34
Rasbach cites Wainwright [p. 424] as one of his sources for his insistence that JLC was charged with protecting Phillips’, Stewart’s & Richardson’s Batteries on the morning of June 18, but Wainwright does not confirm this. Next, Rasbach, somehow, takes a direct quote from JLC regarding his ordering his brigade to move to their left, and yet still insists that the brigade then moved to the right to a position between “the Avery and the Taylor  farms,” which were, indeed, to the right of Chamberlain and his brigade. I think Rasbach got lost. On p. 33, note 3, Rasbach also makes a simple subject much more complicated than it actually is.  Slant fire merely means that, as opposed to direct fire or enfilading fire, slant fire is being hurled at a target on the enemy’s line at an angle.  While Rasbach tries to imply that the description of the slant fire the 5th Corps was receiving on the morning of June 18th also conveys information about the enemy’s elevation in relation that of the 5th Corps.  this is inaccurate and grossly misleading.  To my knowledge, describing artillery fire as slant fire gives us no information about the relative differences of elevation between the battery and their target.

Pp. 35-37
Rasbach refers to Parker’s History of the 51st Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers, a 9th Corps Regiment, in what, to my mind, is an unproductive effort to prove that the section of the railroad cut that unit occupied, because it was very deep at that point, must therefore be the one and only part of the Norfolk and Petersburg railroad that should be referred to as the “Deep Cut.”  Rasbach seemingly insists that whenever anybody uses the words “deep cut,” that they must be referring to that specific location and only that location.  This is more than a little problematic in that there were many parts of the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad cut that could be and were described as “deep,” and therefore very difficult to get over, in or out of.  But in Rasbach’s mind only the 51st Pennsylvania’s location should be considered, “the Deep Cut.”  This is nonsensical, for the many advancing infantrymen of the 9th and 5th Corps faced their own version, however deep, of the deep cut. It is also inexplicable as to why Rasbach should choose to draw our attention to testimony from the 51st Pa., a 9th Corps regiment, in that it only offers additional evidence that it was the 9th Corps, not some part of the 5th Corps that was at the future site of Ft. Morton, and, therefore, facing the future site of the Crater.  Once again, I ask author Rasbach how can you insist that elements of the 5th Corps, and Chamberlain in particular, were assaulting where there is ample evidence that the 9th Corps was positioned? Then seemingly abandoning “The Deep Cut,” Rasbach then rummages around in “The Civil War Diary of Henry Fitzgerald Charles [available online @webarchive.org], taking us to another, less deep part of deep cut.  You still with me? Though the time of day is undisclosed, Charles’ diary describes the location of the 21st Pa Cav [dismounted], Sweitzer’s Brigade, Rasbach’s great great grandfather’s regiment, as being located near the Taylor house, where the deep cut was only 20 ft deep.  It, nonetheless, posed a considerable obstacle to the 2nd Brigade’s advance, and leaves us asking what on earth is Rasbach trying to prove here?  I do not dispute that Sweitzer, including the 21st Pa., were somewhere to the left of the 9th Corps and Crawford’s 5th Corps Division on June 18th, but I have to make the observation, again, that this material offers absolutely no proof whatsoever of Chamberlain’s position or movements at anytime on June 18th.  Nor does the inclusion of a lithograph depicting some part of the 5th Corps in some part of the deep cut six weeks later on July 30th before the mine explosion clarify anything.  This in no way adds to our enlightenment regarding Chamberlain and the 1st Brigade’s positions and where they assaulted at 3 p.m. on June 18th, 1864.

Pp. 38-39
Rasbach again cites the Charles diary, p. 8, an erroneous citation, since p. 8 refers to events in 1863.  Here Rasbach also inserts his own words into direct quotes by Chamberlain, “I [wheeled] to my clump of woods [which was nearby]….”  While Rasbach at least indicates that he is adding words to JLC’s quotes with his own words and ideas by the use of brackets, it is a practice that, in my mind, should be used rarely, and only when the editor or commentator inserting the words is absolutely certain that the words being inserted are in agreement with and clarifying the thoughts of the original author or speaker.  In Rasbach’s case, I disagree strenuously that Rasbach’s inserted words are in agreement with Chamberlain’s intended narrative.  Another unfortunate example of Rasbach inserting his own particularly unsubstantiated ideas into a direct JLC quote is, “We made for the guns [to Chamberlain’s right- they were flanking the Confederate battery’s right].” Rasbach also asserts that he thinks JLC was confusing his lefts and his rights, while I suggest that Rasbach is the one who is confusing his lefts and his rights.  Rasbach’s description of JLC’s passage back to his brigade and their subsequent attempt to surprise the Rebel battery by coming in on their left flank is, it seems to me, a confused mess.

Pp. 40-42
There was no way JLC could “bypass” the cut as Rasbach suggests.  The cut had to be crossed, and JLC and the 1st Brigade crossed it, on a bridge, which Rasbach seems to accept, but ignores in his p. 41 map.  The dotted lines of JLC’s and Griffin’s scout and the Rebel battery’s position and subsequent withdrawal are all pure conjecture on Rasbach’s part.  Rasbach gives considerable attention to DeLacy’s testimony, which Rasbach dates as having been written in 1903, while my copy of this document is undated.  If DeLacy’s account was, in fact, written in 1903, 40 or so years after the event, Rasbach seems in no way concerned that DeLacy’s memory might be faulty after all that passage of time, while Rasbach questions JLC’s ability to accurately remember details after that many years.  I’ll remind the reader that DeLacy was a Sargent in the 143rd Pa., and I came to feel, after consideration of others’ testimony, that DeLacy was not always a particularly reliable witness.  For instance, DeLacy stated that the order to attack at Rives’ Salient came from the 1st Division’s commander, Gen. Charles Griffin, while JLC remained unsure who had given the order for the attack.  Warren?  Meade?  Grant?  But if it had been Griffin, who JLC remained close friends with until Griffin’s death in 1867, JLC would have had no doubts about the origin of the assault order.  The map on p. 41 labels the future site of Ft. Hell as some undefined area next to the Jerusalem Plank Rd., while it must be remembered that Ft. Hell [or Ft Sedgwick] had a very large footprint when finished, straddling the Jerusalem Plank Rd. but also eventually extended far to the northeast, including the area in front of Rives’ Salient.  The map also shows JLC’s first brigade making a sharp right turn after crossing the cut at a place where there is apparently no bridge, though JLC clearly utilized a bridge.  There is also the continuing unnerving issue of JLC heading straight for the area where the 9th Corps, Crawford’s Division and Sweitzer’s 2nd brigade are known to be already positioned.  Rasbach’s recap on p. 42 inexplicably states that Bigelow’s battery came up behind Chamberlain at 4:00 p.m.,… that’s an hour after JLC and the 1st Brigade made their assault with Bigelow’s among those batteries supporting Chamberlain’s attack. Moving further into the Twilight Zone, Rasbach then comments, “(It is important to keep in mind that the major assault on the entrenched Harris Line is still in the future).” Is it possible that Rasbach is actually trying to suggest that JLC’s 3 p.m. attack didn’t happen until Sweitzer’s assault at 6 p.m.?!?!?  I know Tilton’s report on the 1st Brigade’s 3 p.m. assault confuses everything, perhaps intentionally, but to suggest that JLC’s assault didn’t happen at 3 p.m. to me is nonsensical [root word: nonsense].

Pp. 43-46
Rasbach again mistakenly states that the order for JLC’s assault came from Charles Griffin (see above, notes on pp. 41-43).  Since Rasbach cannot accept that Chamberlain was anywhere on the morning of June 18th but at the position he insists upon, next to the Baxter or Sussex Rd, he suggests that I, author Diane Monroe Smith, think that JLC marched determinedly from the Baxter Rd position where Rasbach has them, over to Rives’ Salient, and perhaps even to the left of Cutler and Ayres.  When in fact, I, based upon extensive research and many participants’ statements, state that JLC and the 1st Brigade went to the area confronting Rives’ Salient in the first place, where Bigelow and company joined them there, and the 1st Brigade’s attack was made from that position, with only Cutler’s Division well to their left and rear.  Save me from Rasbach’s erroneous descriptions of my interpretations.
Again, how can anybody imagine that anyone, let alone a smart cookie like Chamberlain, could possibly mistake one of the original Dimmock line fortifications [also don’t forget the fire coming from Ft. Mahone] for the mounds of earth that the Rebels had been able to throw together since 1 a.m. that morning?  As mentioned before,  the works on the Dimmock were formidable enough to cause two West Point trained engineers to hesitate and/or avoid attacking them, with Gen. Quincy Gillmore deciding not to attack at all, and Gen. Baldy Smith, after much delay for preparation, making a less than full-hearted attempt.
Next up, Rasbach insists that since JLC refers to that part of the Rebel line he was ordered to attack as “interior works,” that Chamberlain (and I, by inference) is mistaken about his having attacked an original Dimmock Line fortification.  We are thereby treated to a lengthy discourse on the supposed definitions (according to Rasbach) of terms such as interior, inner, works, and fortifications.  Rasbach insists that interior works means the same thing as inner line or interior line.  I do not agree.  Since works is generally accepted to be an abbreviated form of breastworks or earthworks, I do not believe that JLC’s reference to the enemy’s “works” can be translated as being synonymous with the enemy’s line, as Rasbach would have us believe.
I find these pages revealing, for I do believe we are finally getting down to the purpose of Rasbach’s research and writing, and that is to “prove” that JLC didn’t do anything special on June 18th.  Rasbach, I believe, is working hard to prove that Chamberlain did not attack the formidable Dimmock line fortification at Rives’ Salient, but assaulted the some hastily constructed enemy line as did the rest of the 5th Corps [See p. 144 for Rasbach’s map]. The map has the entire 5th and 9th Corps crammed into a mile and a half battle line confronting the enemy’s new Harris line, and this is the only area where Rasbach thinks any attacks by those corps took place on June 18th.
I also disagree to some extent with Rasbach’s labeling of the Harris line as being constructed on June 17.  While it is true that some work was begun by slaves on June 17, for the most part when the Rebels abandoned the Hagood line at 1 a.m. on June 18th to fall back to the new Harris line, most found not a spade of dirt had been turned, and they were handicapped by a complete lack of tools with which to dig.  So what amount of earth had the Rebels been able to move that morning of June 18th, and how could it conceivably be mistaken for an original Dimmock Line fortification? [See Walter Clark’s Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina, p. 363 for a good description of just how little the Rebels had been able to accomplish on their brand new line since their withdrawal from the Hagood line early on the 18th.  Also see “Memorable Days,” for a description of the Rebels’ new line in some places being only two feet high. http://www.beyondthecrater.com/resources/np/postwar-np/np-18700702-plantation-atlanta-gracie-brig-2nd-petersburg/ ]  Once again, I can’t help but think, since there is such convincing evidence that there is no way anyone could mistake the hastily constructed Harris line for the fortifications and artillery of the Dimmock line, in this case Rives’ Salient and Ft. Mahone, that Rasbach must assume Chamberlain was lying.

Pp. 46-49
In the paragraph footnoted #6, Rasbach, with an opening quotation mark, begins a JLC quote, but fails to mark the close of the quote when he wanders off into his own description of Chamberlain’s position.  Since all of Rasbach’s descriptions of JLC and the 1st Brigade’s movements and positions are based upon his faulty supposition of where the Rebel field artillery JLC was trying to dislodge was located, if you don’t agree that that was where the Rebel battery was, you’ll be unable to agree, or perhaps even follow, Rasbach’s subsequent scenario.  Speaking of scenarios, Rasbach states that my description, and thereby Chamberlain’s descriptions of his movements on the morning and afternoon of June 18 are “alternate scenarios.”  He declares that JLC couldn’t have been at Rives’ Salient because Ayres was there.  His “proof” for this statement is a report sent by Ayres to Warren the morning of June 18th, therefore proving nothing regarding Ayers’ or Chamberlain’s positions at 3 p.m. that afternoon.
There are so many errors in this paragraph, that it is extremely hard to follow, since his arguments are designed to dispute JLC’s having been in a position that no one, including Chamberlain, claims he occupied.  Rasbach again states that JLC could not have been at the future site of Ft. Hell near the Jerusalem Plank Rd.  I’ll remind the reader again that the future footprint of Ft. Hell was large, and extended into the area fronting Rives’ Salient.  Rasbach also again expresses his mistaken claim that JLC stated his right was on the railroad cut.  An no point did Chamberlain claim his right was on the railroad.  JLC did, a number of times, express his anxiety about the presence of of the deep railroad cut on his right that would be a real problem for his brigade and the batteries supporting it should they have to make a hasty withdrawal.  Rasbach inexplicably denies that there was a swampy area or stream in front of Rives’ Salient, while the period maps we consulted clearly show that there was. In fact, it is still there.  I must therefore suggest that it is Rasbach’s description of JLC’s movements and positions that comprise an “alternate scenario,” and not an alternative that stands up to scrutiny.
Rasbach draws our attention to Thomas Chamberlin’s 150th Pennsylvania’s unit history, since apparently Rasbach is unaware that the author was not at Petersburg on June 18th, having resigned in March of 1864. [http://deila.dickinson.edu/theirownwords/author/ChamberlinT.htm]. Nonetheless, Rasbach gives us T. Chamberlin’s account, though I can’t help but notice that Rasbach does not include any of T. Chamberlin’s effusive expressions of admiration for Joshua Chamberlain, nor his assurances of the great confidence the 1st Brigade had in their commander.  [See Susan Natale’s http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.com/150pa.php] Please notice that Rasbach alternates between spelling Thomas’ name correctly, “Chamberlin,” or most often, mistakenly, “Chamberlain,” an error I’ve made in my own work.  Rasbach also omits T. Chamberlin’s description of the AoP advance apparently because it does  not fit his theories.  T. Chamberlin wrote, “In the general advance of the Second, Ninth and Fifth Corps, on June 18th, the Fifth was on the left, and had the greatest distance to traverse,- probably not less than a mile and a half.”  This statement does not fit well with Rasbach’s insistence that JLC’s 1st Brigade never relinquished their hold upon the deep railroad cut or left its vicinity.  So Rasbach instead substitutes his own version of the 1st Brigade’s advance.
But there is another example of omission or “selectivity” that is more seriously misleading.  Though Rasbach, in his bibliography, lists only the 1905 edition of Thomas Chamberlin’s history, on pp. 47 & 49 of his book, Rasbach decided to quote from a different earlier edition, one that Rasbach cites as the “Open Library version” of T. Chamberlin’s account.  I’ve set the words from his quote that I wish you to notice in bold type:
“At the signal- which was given about 4 p.m.- Major Jones’s command sprang nimbly through the hollow to the summit of the little hill, and seeing the long line of the 187th Pennsylvania following in admirable array, with the other supports close upon their heels, dashed swiftly into the second ravine and up its farther slop to the very base of a formidable earthwork which was subsequently blown up by Burnside’s famous mine.”
These words that I’ve set in bold type are drawn from the 1895 edition Thomas Chamberlin’s book.  But these bold type words that I’ve pointed out to you don’t appear in the 1905 edition, apparently because someone pointed out to Thomas Chamberlin, who wasn’t there, that describing Chamberlain and the 1st Brigade’s assault as having taken place at the future side of the Crater was incorrect.  Susan Natale, with her great knowledge of Chamberlain archival material, was the first to notice the significant discrepancy in that quotation between the two editions, with Rasbach’s quoting the earlier edition, despite the listing of the later edition in his bibliography.  Did Rasbach notice the all important discrepancy in that quotation between the two editions, and still choose to use the earlier erroneous one?
Rasbach also presents another Jesperson map on p. 48 that is supposed to show how well the descriptions of the terrain fit the area opposite the Crater, but I’d like to point out that it also fits the terrain as it was in front of Rives’ Salient, especially if you use a map that shows the correct position of Poor Creek/Taylor Branch, which Rasbach inexplicably denies existed and subsequently fails to show on his map.  I’d hate to think it was omitted because it didn’t “fit.”  But then Rasbach also fails to mention or address JLC’s many descriptions of Ft. Mahone on his left, and the fire he and his brigade were enduring from it.  That doesn’t fit Rasbach’s theories either.  The unreadable map of the area in front of the Crater [an area that Rasbach, and apparently only Rasbach, insists on calling “the Horseshoe,”] on p. 49, shows, or I should say doesn’t show, a modern LIDAR image superimposed on the Michler map, and proves nothing.  Using today’s terrain to prove or disprove anything regarding terrain, wooded areas, sloping ground, etc. is a lesson in futility, and should be approached with great caution.  For example, the ground around Rives Salient was bulldozed to create a housing development, while a large part of the site of Ft. Hell was obliterated to build a shopping center which is now occupied by a church and its large parking lot.

P. 50
Rasbach asks us again to rely on the 1905 testimony of the author of the 150th Pa. history, Thomas Chamberlin, who wasn’t there. Rasbach also refers to a Sgt. Frey [he was actually a corporal in the 150th Pa at the time of the battle], who may indeed have been the source for Chamberlin’s description of the attack. Somebody must have described the Crater as the site of the assault to Thomas Chamberlin, so are we being asked to give particular weight to the testimony of Cpl. Frey, as opposed to that of Col. Chamberlain, the man who led his 1st Brigade to the point where his attack to place, and led his brigade’s battle lines in the assault.  I’m not comfortable with that. Let’s consider a point regarding the ease at which directions and landmarks can be confused.  For instance, Ned Smith, my husband and CW author, after extensive research and consulting period maps, did the maps for my book, Chamberlain at Petersburg.  It took some time to realize that the Sussex Rd., the Baxter Rd. and Norfolk Rd. on the Petersburg front were all names for exactly the same road.  How can that be? Think about it.  I live on a road in Maine that leads to one of America’s favorite national parks, Acadia National Park on Mt. Desert Island, home of the famous resort Bar Harbor.  If you are in Bangor, the only nearby city of any size, the road to Mt. Desert is called the Bar Harbor Rd.  If you are in Bar Harbor, the road back to civilization is called the Bangor Rd..  Do you see?  So consider, when any veteran of Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade was asked to describe their June 18th fight at Petersburg, in an effort to give the listener a landmark they may have heard of, it would be no surprise if the raconteur utilized the notorious Crater.  Unless you were an AoP veteran, how many people would have heard of the future site of Ft. Hell?  Before we leave the testimony of Cpl. Frey, Rasbach also makes the surprising claim that Frey describes that the 1st Brigade attacked twice, once at 3 p.m., and again with Sweitzer’s brigade at 6 p.m.!  I’m unable to understand why Rasbach believes that the quotation he uses from Frey substantiates this, unless he is relying on Frey’s words, “…At six in the evening the corps was formed for the last charge.”
Again, I can’t accept that. This claim also ignores the testimony of another participant in  Sweitzer’s attack who complained about the failure of Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade to make the attack with them, though the author, Robert Carter, knew and was disregarding that Chamberlain was in the division’s hospital, and many of his men were dead and wounded on the field after their 3 p.m. attack.  [Carter, Robert Four Brothers in Blue , 1913.]
Rasbach also quotes Ed Bearrs’ description of the site of Chamberlain’s and Sweitzer’s assaults on June 18th as having been made across the ridge that separated the two branches of Poor Creek/Taylor’s Branch.  But since Rasbach denies the existence of any part of Poor Creek/Taylor Branch in front of Rives Salient, Rasbach again insists this can only describe the area in front of the Crater.  While Bearrs’ text does not confirm Rasbach’s premise, we may nonetheless be given an important insight as to the source of much of the material that Rasbach has used to defend his theories.  Bryce Suderow, Rasbach’s researcher and the man Rasbach describes as his “mentor,” is named prominently on the cover of The Petersburg Campaign as contributor to Bearrs’ book, for Suderow provided sidebars and a maps designed by Skoch, I assume based on material provided by Suderow, to accompany Bearrs’ text.  Note that Bearrs is revered by the Civil War community for his vast knowledge and his willingness to share it over many, many years.  For this two volume set, The Petersburg Campaign, vol. I & II, Bearrs received the prestigious  Douglas Southall Freeman Award, an honor Suderow sometimes claims for himself, although the award lists Bearrs, and Bearrs alone.  Suderow also, at times, claims authorship of The Petersburg Campaign, as he has in his foreword to Rasbach’s book, p. x, listing his name before Bearrs’.  Please know that this theory, that of shifting all of the 5th Corps’ battle line a mile and a half to the right of their actual positions on June 18th, is in no way substantiated by or based upon Bearrs’ research and writing.  That must be laid at Suderow’s door, for he was the one who inserted a map in Bearrs’ book that shifted that entire 5th Corps position on June 18th a mile and a half to the right despite no collabrative text from Bearrs. It is the first occurrence I’m aware of that anyone believed that JLC was apparently mistaken or lied about having made his assault on June 18, 1864 at Rives Salient. As I’ve mentioned before, Rasbach’s p. 85 map shows an unimaginable pig pile of infantry… namely all of Burnside’s 9th Corps and all of Warren’s 5th Corps crammed into and stacked up on a mile and a half front.  Meanwhile, the fully manned Rebel fortifications that extended to the AoP’s left are left dangerously ignored and unopposed.  Perhaps when this map was published back in 2012, it would have been a good time for questions to be asked about this radical revision, for there is certainly no explanation given. Was the map simply a careless mistake, that has now become a “theory” that subsequently must be defended come what may?  Perhaps we’ll never know.

P. 51
It seems ironic that I should need to employ such a large word count in my assessment of Rasbach’s research and writing, but what I see as a convoluted, often repetitive tangle, one that sometimes even conflicts with itself, needs lots of attention and correction.  First, let’s deal with note 1 on p. 51, in which Rasbach describes my research and writing as an “interpretive paradigm,”in my opinion a pompous and wholly unnecessary way of saying that Chamberlain and other witnesses’ statements are subject to their subjective experiences, and that my interpretation of their statements is also a result of my own subjective interpretations.  I suggest that every human being on the planet, including Dennis Rasbach, is expressing their very own interpretive paradigms.  Your point, other than the futile hope of sounding high falutin’ and, perhaps, impressive though verbose?  Here we also discover that Rasbach is, inexplicably, willing to accept that Chamberlain was, somehow, one mile away from the rest of the Army of the Potomac, even though Rasbach has very firmly stated his intention to prove JLC was bunched up with the rest of the 5th Corps by the Baxter Rd.  But then, Rasbach suggests that JLC’s statement could mean one mile away from the AoP in, apparently, any direction at all… except, apparently, in the direction towards Rives’ Salient.  Rasbach additionally muses that JLC might have meant he was one mile away from the Avery House, the HQ for the 5th Corps, though that is not what Chamberlain said.  Rasbach, in footnote #2, repeats the information that Phillips’, Stewart’s & Richardson’s batteries were the ones actually assigned to Griffin’s 1st Division, and that they spent the entire day near the Baxter Rd.  Then, Rasbach acknowledges, it was Bigelow, Hart and Barnes who ended up with Chamberlain on the afternoon of June 18th.  But unfortunately, it apparently did not occur to Rasbach that it might have been a battery other than the one assigned to the 1st Division that JLC was defending on the morning of June 18th.

P. 52
About half of the many hours I’ve spent considering Rasbach’s writing, citations, bibliography, etc., has been spent chasing down sources like this one in footnote #3 on p. 52.  Here, we are led to believe, if there is any purpose to providing citations, that Bigelow’s testimony supposedly proves Chamberlain’s assault was at the Crater location, a assertion that Rasbach insists upon here and everywhere in his text.  There is nothing in the direct quote he offers here which validates this supposition, for, I’ll point out once again, that where Bigelow was in the morning on June 18th proves nothing regarding where he was in the afternoon. But, with excruciating fairness, I must also take a thorough look at Rasbach’s proffered source in Footnote #3.  Guess what!  After wasting a half hour of my time, and at least an hour each for the two librarians’ who helped me track this down, the source proved unworthy, in that it proved nothing! The cited quotation offers Bigelow’s statement that they first engaged the enemy from the Baxter Rd., and afterwards they supported JLC’s assault.  So, once again, where Bigelow was on the morning of June 18 does not prove where he was at 3 p.m. in the afternoon. Then too, in the same volume holding Bigelow’s report [Supplement to the OR, Pt. 1, v. 7, p. 229] is Phillips’ report [pp. 227-228] which offers a detailed description of Phillips’ Battery’s movements on June 18th acting in concert with Sweitzer’s Brigade, with no mention of Chamberlain being present.  Seems conclusive to me that Rasbach is making a grave error by insisting that it was Phillips, Stewarts and Richardson’s batteries that Chamberlain was ordered to defend on the morning of June 18th.  To continue with another matter, no one I know of, but Rasbach,… certainly not Chamberlain, or me,… ever claimed that JLC scuttled behind Cutler’s 4th Division and Ayer’s 2nd Division over to the Jerusalem Plank Rd.  But Rasbach, nonetheless, offers up this faulty supposition as the only possible explanation for movements and positions described by Chamberlain that culminated in his position in front of Rives’ Salient with Bigelow & Co. behind him on the afternoon of June 18th.  I suggest that Rasbach, in his consideration and subsequent rejection of Chamberlain testimony, got badly lost on the way to Rives’ Salient, and what I see as faulty assessments and piling one mistaken premise upon another, are not substantiated by the evidence offered.  The footnote #4 citation given for the “Noon brought us….” is incorrect, the quote not found on pp. 123 or 124 as stated, but on p. 125 of Baker’s history of the 9th.  Nor is the lengthy Bigelow quote to be found where Rasbach cited it on pp. 125-127.

Pp. 53-55
I’ll draw the readers’ attention to Bigelow’s use of the words “enemy’s works” to describe the focus of Chamberlain’s assault.  Works, as I understand it and stated above, is an abbreviation for earthworks or breastworks, and I question whether what the Rebels had managed to build in the morning hours of June 18th on their new Harris line where Rasbach insists JLC’s brigade fought would be described thusly.  Here Rasbach [I need another synonym for inexplicably] points out that both JLC and Bigelow testify that they crossed the railroad cut on a bridge, while Rasbach, with a map on his p. 41 shows Chamberlain crossing the cut where there was no bridge.  I see that Rasbach tries to explain away this mystery by stating JLC, the 1st Brigade and the batteries crossed on a “hastily reconstructed wooden bridge,” but neither period maps show nor Rasbach’s own map show a bridge existing in the place where Rasbach suggests one was “reconstructed.”  Can’t reconstruct one that wasn’t there in the first place. Nor does this crossing place account for the testimony that the place where the 1st Brigade crossed the cut was where the cut was shallow, or on more level ground than where the cut was deep.  Then, too, Ned Smith, my husband, a CW historian and my mapmaker, who spent many hours studying the evidence and period maps disagrees with Rasbach’s assertion that the math for distances doesn’t work for JLC’s position having been at Rives’ Salient, but only work if JLC turned toward the Crater site. Ned disagrees, and that the distances do work, which is why we supported Chamberlain’s accounts in the first place.
Rasbach again erroneously insists that Bigelow [and apparently JLC] were right next to the railroad cut before their 3 p.m. assault, when the railroad cut was, in fact, some distance away on their right. Rasbach also refers to Mink’s Battery, who, in his report, described that his position was on the right of the 5th Corps, and the battery was described by JLC as being on the far side of the railroad cut from Chamberlain and as firing into the Rebel works near an icehouse on his right front. Mink’s description of being on the 5th Corps right would necessarily pinpoint his position as being to the right of Crawford’s and Sweitzer’s positions, thus putting an intervening division and brigade between Chamberlain and Mink’s positions. [OR 40, I 488] I am not disputing Mink’s position in any way, but I do strenuously disagree with Rasbach’s assumption that Mink and the icehouse Mink refers to was on Chamberlain’s immediate right. We have no evidence of how near to or far from JLC’s right this icehouse was, which Mink fired upon to dislodge Rebels within, and then turned his attention to the Rebel line near the icehouse.  Since an archaeology team has found what they believe to be the remains of what they have identified as an icehouse at the junction of the railroad cut and the Sussex Rd., Rasbach insists that that must be the icehouse referred to in Mink’s and JLC’s description.  Was this icehouse the only icehouse on the field?                                                                                                   Evidence for the prevalence of ice houses in and around Petersburg is provided by William Henderson’s admirable book on the city and its environs, Petersburg in the Civil War, HE Howard, 1998, pp 2, 16.  As Henderson points out, Petersburg received regular shipments of Maine ice, & had been storing that ice to keep their food cool since 1840.                                                                           But, even if it was in fact the icehouse that was near the Rebel works that JLC described Mink as firing at, once again, we have no testimony regarding how far away on the right front the icehouse, the Rebel works, or Mink were from JLC, and it in no way helps clarify Chamberlain’s and the 1st Brigade’s position at 3 p.m. on June 18th.  The caption on Rasbach’s map on p. 55 offers three possible routes and bridges for Bigelow’s crossing of the railroad cut on his way to back up Chamberlain’s assault.  While Rasbach comments, “None of the potential routes allow for an approach near the Jerusalem Plank Road and Rives Salient, I and my mapmaker husband, on close consideration of the evidence, were quite happy to consider the area Rasbach has marked as #3 as the most likely bridge and route.  Not sure where the bridge Rasbach marks on this map as #2 comes from, for it does not appear on his p. 41 map.  Rasbach apparently favors the route and bridge he marks as #1, likely based on his mistaken idea based upon  Wainwright’s report that describes the Bigelow/Barnes and Hart batteries as being on the Baxter/Sussex/Norfolk Rd. at dawn.  Rasbach then mistakenly suggests that they remained on that road on into the day.  While Bigelow & Co. were on the Baxter Rd. at dawn, apparently to the right of Cutler’s division, that position was near the Avery house, and a good mile back from where Rasbach is anxious for Bigelow and Chamberlain to end up, a mile to the north where the railroad cut crosses the Sussex Rd. near the future site of the crater.  Once again, where Bigleow/Barnes/Hart were at sunrise does nothing to prove where they were at 3 p.m..  We thought Rasbach’s boldest of three route arrows was the one he favored for Bigelow & Co.’s route, but to help confuse matters thoroughly, Rasbach also refers to future site of Ft. Meikle in his text as the most likely candidate for Bigelow’s route, but there’s no sign of Ft. Meikle on Rasbach’s p. 55 map.  The Federal Fort Meikle was eventually built a little over a mile to the west of the Avery House, though since Rasbach’s mapmaker tends not to give directional compasses, this might not help you all that much.  [See https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884p.cw0618000/] Nonetheless, we assume that Rasbach is referring to the area he has labelled #2 where the mysterious previously unknown bridge has appeared.  We, Ned and I, do not agree that this is the likely Chamberlain and Bigelow & Co. route, for we strongly favor the area and bridge Rasbach labeled #3 but which he rejects.

P.  56
The struggle to establish the relative positions of JLC, and the batteires of Mink & Bigelow, etc. continues.  I’ve no argument with Mink’s reported position, to the right of the 5th Corps and nearly opposite the reservoir [another landmark mentioned in Rasbach’s text but not on his map].  The reservoir is about 3/4 mile west of the site of the Crater.  But we strenuously disagree with Rasbach’s apparent belief that Bigelow and Hart remained “grouped” as Rasbach describes it with Mink.  Rasbach offers us Buell’s Cannoneer as evidence, but Buell’s Cannoneer clearly states that Bigelow and Hart were ordered away from Mink, and Buell in no way confirms Bigelow’s route, where he crossed the railroad cut, or where it was he supported JLC’s assault on the Rebel works. Nor do I agree with Rasbach’s insistence that Mink was on JLC’s immediate right [see above notes on pp. 54-55]  Mink would not need to be on JLC’s immediate right in order to have had an effect on the 1st Brigade’s advance.  I’ll mention that no one I know of, other than Rasbach and his mentor Bryce Suderow, thinks that Rives’ Salient constituted the position of the 5th Corps’ “far left” on the afternoon of June 18. Therefore we don’t agree that, as Rasbach insists, “This line of evidence overwhelmingly indicates that Chamberlain’s brigade was near the Baxter Road, not Rives’ Salient, when he was planning his infantry assault.”

Pp. 57-60
We’re now treated to a dissertation on icehouses.  Rasbach and an archaeologist, Julia Steele, who apparently supports his theories, insist that icehouses were rare, a surprising observation given the popularity of icehouses elsewhere in Victorian America.  Rasbach and Steele also tell us that they are elaborate, easily identifiable structures, which again is a surprising statement given that icehouse could be anything from a small hole in the ground with a roof over it, to well insulated barn like structure. See http://www.librarypoint.org/early_ice_houses concerning the prevalence of ice houses in 19th Century Virginia, with the information that, after the CW and ice delivery became common, many were filled in, and therefore less apt to be noticed or rediscovered.  Or consider the evidence presented in author Theron Hiles’ The Ice Crop: How to Harvest, Store, Ship and Use Ice. New York, US: Orange Judd Company, 1893, which suggests that some farmers in Virginia, had developed much cheaper icehouses, elevated off the ground, built from wood and insulated with hay.  Then again, the icehouse at the Taylor’s Farm doesn’t really seem to fit the bill as the one that Mink’s battery drove the Rebels out in the morning before turning their guns on the enemy gun emplacements, on what apparently was the nearby Rebel line.  The Taylor farm with remains of its icehouse lies more than a quarter of a mile from the newly established Confederate Harris line that Mink began shelling after driving the enemy from an icehouse.  For many reasons, I’m not comfortable with Rasbach’s statement on p. 59, “After he crossed the railroad on the afternoon of June 18th, Chamberlain discovered an icehouse to his right front. Mink’s Federal battery was firing into it.”  Rasbach’s statement is, I believe, laden with misdirection and misinformation in that we are apparently expected to accept, though the evidence presented has not and will not support it, that JLC remained in the area adjacent to the railroad cut.  Then, Rasbach would have us believe, immediately after crossing the railroad at a point in proximity to the Taylor farm, Chamberlain personally discovered on his immediate right, an icehouse, and observed Mink’s nearby battery firing into said icehouse Taken in conjunction with what will be Rasbach’s many assertions that the Taylor farm icehouse is the icehouse, we are being asked to accept a great many unsubstantiated details here.  And while LIDAR, spiffy new technology that it is, may or may not prove that there was a structure that may be an icehouse in the area to which Rasbach wishes to transplant Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade, this is, in my opinion, worse than idle speculation.
Changing gears, Rasbach ineffectually offers Wainwright’s testimony for June 18th as proof that JLC was not at Rives’ Salient.  Rasbach cites p. 426 only, but it he had considered more of Wainwright’s statement, pp. 424-426, it would have been more useful and provided more insight.   The neglected pages, for instance, offer ample evidence that the batteries assigned to a division were not necessary those which were with their divisions that day.  Rasbach here suggests that, since Wainwright was nominally in command, (and this statement is debatable), of the 5th Corps’ 12 batteries, he would not have left the batteries on the 5th Corps right to go to the 5th Corps left.  Not only did Wainwright go to the 5th Corps left, he went farther than JLC’s position to spend time with Cutler’s division on Chamberlain left.  Without evidence and considerable faulty reasoning, Rasbach again erroneously states that Bigelow and Chamberlain were near the railroad cut, and the fact that that railroad cut eventually filled up with 5th Corps wounded proves nothing regarding JLC and his 1st Brigade’s position at 3 p.m. on June 18.

Pp. 61-63
Rasbach entitles his Chapter 8, “Facts Matter: Major Roebling’s Rule.”  What Rasbach invents and decides to call “Roebling’s Rule,” may be summarized thusly: short attacks over favorable terrain succeed.  Conversely, long attacks over unfavorable terrain fail.  Since I have considerable respect for the highly intelligent and battle-hardened Roebling, I’d much prefer that we refer to this for what it is, Rasbach’s Rule rather than Roebling’s Rule.  Rasbach inexplicably replaces the word “getting” with “advancing” within a direct quote from Roebling.  Rasbach also fails to acknowledge that Roebling, though an extraordinary scout and indispensable aide to Warren, could not be everywhere and see everything on the 5th Corps field of battle.  It should also be know that Roebling’s “Report” was written in December of 1864, many months after June 18 battle.  I believe that Roebling’s reference to Crawford and Griffin confronting the Rebels where the railroad cut was closer to the enemy likely refers to Griffin’s 2nd Brigade on Crawford’s left, as opposed to Griffin’s whole division, which would, of course include Chamberlain.  Since there is no testimony to support it, I disagree that JLC was with Sweitzer and Crawford. Rasbach makes the startling claim in note #4, p. 62, that Sweitzer’s Brigade attacked in conjunction with Chamberlain’s Brigade.  While Tilton’s report does it’s best to confuse who attacked and when, only Tilton and Rasbach, to my knowledge, try to cast any doubt on the fact that JLC’s 1st Brigade attacked at 3 p.m., while Tilton and Sweitzer 2nd Brigade did not attack until 6 p.m.. I’m unaware of the purpose of Rasbach’s map on p. 63, emblazoned with the words “Roebling’s Rule,” but I guess Rasbach is trying to make the point that an attack at the future site of the Crater would have been easier than the one JLC made at Rives’ Salient.  What is this supposed to prove?!?!?

Pp. 63-64
Rasbach repeats his points.  A running theme develops here.  Rasbach lays out his case, illogical though we may perceive it to be, that because Rives’ Salient was such a difficult, if not impossible place to attack, JLC didn’t attack there.  He must therefore have attacked where Rasbach says he did, 1.5 miles to the right where Sweitzer’s division was positioned near the future site of the Crater.  Point 1) Because JLC claims that some of his men got within 20 ft of the enemy works, he couldn’t have been at Rives’ Salient since Point 2) Sweitzer also claims his men got close to the enemy breastwork, so, according to Rasbach, JLC must have been where Sweitzer a mile or more to the right. Point 3)  Since Rasbach judges, though I do not, that Roebling states Griffin’s and Crawford’s Divisions had more success in their advances, JLC was therefore with Sweitzer. Point 4)  Yes, the railroad cut does change direction, but what of it?  Point 5) I believe Roebling was referring to Griffin’s 2nd Division, Sweitzer’s Brigade, not Chamberlain’s. Point 6)  Rasbach repeats the error, his own misconception that Chamberlain’s right was adjacent the railroad cut. No matter how many times you repeat a mistaken point, it is still a mistaken point.  Since the ground at Rives’ Salient now contains housing developments, malls and parking lots, we must rely on period maps with elevation, which show us that Rives’ Salient was indeed on somewhat higher ground than JLC’s starting off point, somewhere in the vicinity of the future site of Ft. Hell. Since an open field partly crossed by a stream existed where Chamberlain started and made his assault on Rives’ Salient, Rasbach’s insistence that only his Crater site matches the details and Rives’ Salient does not is in error. Point 7) Rasbach, who insists Ayres, not JLC, was at Rives’ Salient, here essentially declares that, because of the “topographical constaints and enemy fire coming from behind the permanent fortifications at that point in the line,” no one could have attacked Rives’ Salient.  Rasbach uses Roebling to try to prove Ayers, not JLC, was at Rives’ Salient.  Roebling states no time of day for Ayers possible proximity to Rives, and Ayers actually description of being at Rives’ Salient occurred earlier in the day on June 18th, thereby proving nothing as to where Ayers or Chamberlain were at 3 p.m..     Rasbach describes his points above as an “overwhelming weight of evidence,” which prove, in his mind, that neither Chamberlain, nor anyone else could have or should have attacked at Rives’ Salient.  Perhaps they shouldn’t have, but I, and a number of other historians, believe they did. I am not convinced by what Rasbach describes as “the overwhelming weight of this evidence.”  Quite the contrary.  Rasbach goes on to state, “…it would have been impossible for Chamberlain to have accomplished what he did detached from Griffin’s division and attacking alone a mile farther left away from the rest of the Army and nowhere near the railroad cut.”   I’m not willing to take Rasbach’s word that, that not only did Chamberlain not know where he was, but he did not do the things he said he and his brigade did.  This seems to move Rasbach’s theories beyond Chamberlain’s possibly being confused or forgetful, and into the realm of his being a liar.

Pp. 65-67
Rasbach, after sending JLC on an imaginary trek toward the Jerusalem Plank Rd., again suggests that no one could or should have attacked at Rives’ Salient.  He cites Lt. Col. Theodore Lyman, Meade’s aide, who was a bright academic with little military experience, who spent much of the day with Warren, and they rode out on an open plain to watch the 3 p.m. attack. Rasbach acknowledges that Warren states he could only see the center of his line, and one could describe JLC’s position at Rives’ Salient as being at the center of the 5th Corps line.  But Rasbach nonetheless insists that the entire 5th Corps was stacked up on the Federal line from left to right with Ayers at Rives’ Salient, then Cutler’s Division, Griffin’s Division [both JLC & Sweitzers’s Brigades] and Crawford’s Division and Burnside’s 9th Corps, all crammed into the Federal line confronting Pegram’s Salient.  It’s hard to explain how it was that Warren and Lyman couldn’t see anything but their center since supposedly the entire 5th Corps was, according to Rasbach, holed up in an area less than a mile. Once again, I can only wonder at how the heck Rasbach explains how the entire 5th Corps managing to be where there’s ample proof Burnside was fighting, with the only assistance from the 5th Corps coming from Crawford and Sweitzer on the 9th Corps’ left.  Lyman’s reference to JLC’s wounding and 5th Corps wounded sheltering in the railroad cut is misleading, for it might lead one to assume, erroneously, that JLC & the 1st Brigade were directly adjacent to the cut.  So, according to Rasbach, since there were obstacles to Warren and Lyman seeing the troops at Rives’ Salient, JLC therefore, must have been at the Crater where Warren and Lyman could “see” them.  And though Lyman does write about JLC’s wounding and the failure of his assault, we do not know that he actually witnessed it. The map on 67 is nothing less than astonishing, with a pig pile of troops in front of Pegram’s, or Elliott’s Salient as it is sometimes referred to. Why would Warren and Burnside have stacked up this many troops in this confined space, while ignoring the fully-manned and dangerously untended enemy lines stretching to their left.  Further, why would Gen. Meade allow it?
To continue, Rasbach’s statement [p.68] that Chamberlain’s line retreated to the railroad cut after their repulse offers no citation, so we can’t no what he is considering for evidence, but we are told by Bigelow that many of JLC’s repulsed soldiers sought safety behind his guns after their attack failed.   If others hightailed it as far as the railroad cut, they did so from their failed assault on Rives’ Salient, retracing their brigade’s steps of the morning.  When Rasbach does bestow a citation on us in this chapter, he often makes use of David Lowe’s Meade’s Army.  Quite the fascinating read, for their are quotes from Lyman and other key players that never appeared in the Lyman book edited by Agassiz, or any other book I’m aware of.  Personally, I had great difficulty deciphering just where the sources for these quotes could be found, and in other cases, had trouble being sure just where the direct Lyman quote began and ended, as opposed to where Lowe’s statement of his opinions and his assessments began and ended.

P. 69
Rasbach’s Chapter 9 is entitled “A Twist of Irony: Sweitzer’s Position Holds the Key,” and in many ways, I believe this is the key to Rasbach’s theories.  Remember that Rasbach’s quest to learn about his Civil War great great grandfather may have been somewhat disappointing, in that he was a newly minted cavalryman who, with his fellow troopers, had been dismounted (stripped of their horses and equipment), turned into untrained infantryman and assigned to a lackluster brigade that had not covered itself with glory at Petersburg or anywhere else.  Keeping this in mind, read on.  Once again, Rasbach draws our attention to one Col. William S. Tilton of Sweitzer’s Brigade, who, after the wounded Chamberlain was carried off the field, was “elevated” as Rasbach puts it to command of JLC’s brigade.  Thus, since Sweitzer had mustered out in July and Chamberlain was in the hospital, Tilton, got to write the report for the 1st Brigade and 2nd Brigade of just what happened on June 18th, and it could be used as a primer on how to obfuscate.  Remember that Tilton and Sweitzer had gotten into hot water for their questionable performances at Gettysburg, while that pesky Chamberlain had covered himself with glory on Little Round Top, sufficient to catch his commanders’ eyes and win the Maine colonel brigade command.  JLC’s brigade command had him leaping over the head of colonels senior to him, colonels like Tilton.  Also remember that at Petersburg, all of the 5th Corps were ordered to attack at 3 p.m..  Chamberlain went in, Cutler went in, Sweitzer and Tilton did not, until three hours later, with no reason for Sweitzer’s failure ever given that I’m aware of.  With many of Sweitzer’s Brigade at or close to their muster out date, did the well-known “caution” that overcomes some men near the end of their tour of duty come into play? Yet Rasbach tells us Sweitzer “holds the key.”

Pp. 70-73
Tilton’s report so muddies the waters of what the 1st and 2nd Brigades did on June 18, with Tilton reducing JLC’s assault under intense fire upon the fully manned Rives’ Salient with additional enfilading fire from Ft. Mahone to this: “The 1st Brigade, Colonel Chamberlain, then advanced to the ravine and took position on the left of Colonel Sweitzer’s brigade.  This was done under a very heavy fire, and the brigade lost more than 200 men, including Colonel Chamberlain, who was wounded.”  The casualties for Chamberlain’s Brigade were, in fact, 314 killed, wounded or missing.  Is this just another case of following Grant’s orders to underreport casualties?  Rasbach then cites the post-war letter of Major Knowles, 21st Pa, to JLC, which does offer testimony that JLC was on the 21st’s left at an undisclosed time on June 18th.  It does not provide proof that Chamberlain was at the future site of the Crater with Sweitzer at 3 p.m.  I don’t dispute Sweitzer’s position in that vicinity, but I don’t accept that Chamberlain was there also.  Tilton is our only “witness,” to Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade being on Sweitzer’s immediate left at 3 p.m., and I’ve no compelling reason to place more confidence in Tilton’s testimony above and beyond Chamberlain’s.  Quite the opposite, actually, since Tilton had some axes to grind. Rasbach gives us casualty figures for his ancestor’s 21st Pa. for Cold Harbor, but not Petersburg. While he offers testimony from a Major John Lentz that the 21st was in Sweitzer’s battle line, Rasbach seems to admit to some doubt  that the 21st actually fought at Petersburg when he comments that holding that regiment back would have made no sense.  Actually, the 21st Pa. were not only green, but apparently untrained in field tactics, which might be a good reason to hold them back. Rasbach also offers a letter from an anonymous member of the 21st Pa to a Pennsylvania newspaper, July 1, 1864, stating that Sweitzer was moved to the front on June 18 to relieve the 9th Corps.  Is that Gen. Willcox of the 9th Corps that I hear spinning in his grave?  Also, please see map p. 73 labeled “Sweitzer’s Skirmish and Battle Lines, 10 a.m.-1 p.m.” one of the few of the Rasbach/Jespersen maps that have the all important time of day on them.  Note the prominent deployment of Sweitzer’s Brigade, seemingly elbowing everyone else out of their way in the brigade’s supposed enthusiasm to get into the fray. Rasbach seemingly acknowledges the parting of the ways between between Sweitzer’s and Chamberlain’s Brigades sometime before 1 p.m., but then he has Chamberlain veering wildly to the right again, away from his pathway directly toward Rives’ Salient, as if he were, for no apparent reason, hurrying his brigade back to join Sweitzer’s left near the Crater site.

Pp. 74-75
These pages are once again devoted to Tilton’s devious report.  I’d like to point out that, when an historian or editor is confident that he can add information that clarifies or corrects an error, it is permitted, though great restraint should be exercised, to insert that commentary, enclosed by warning brackets, within a direct quote.  Rasbach, on p. 74 within Tilton’s report on Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade, exercised his privilege with the unfortunate result of adding misinformation rather than clarification.  “There it was [on the left of Sweitzer, near the Baxter Road], just before dark that I was placed in command with orders to charge when troops on my right and left did.”  Tilton, also throws much dust in the readers’ eyes, with his alarming casualness about which times and which attacks he’s referring to and who led them, Tilton delivers a dramatic rendition of himself, reconnoitering and preparing for a last big assault, only to finally share with us that that final attack was called off.  As for Rasbach’s statement that “Time, space, and reason (when using terrain and historical documents) do not allow for a long detour to the Jerusalem Plank Road and Rives’ Salient,” the only unsubstatiated “detour” is the one Rasbach has Chamberlain making to join the veer away from his route to Rives’ Salient (not the Jerusalem Plank Rd. no matter how many times Rasbach says it) and irrationally cramming himself in with the rest of the 5th Corps at Pegram’s.

Pp. 76-77
These movements by the 1st Brigade and other 5th Corps units the night of June 18 and in the days thereafter offer no evidence and throw no light on where Chamberlain and his brigade were at 3 p.m. on June 18th.

Pp. 78-80
Again, in this case, where 5th Corps units were in the hours and days subsequent to JLC’s 3 p.m., June 18th assault throws no light on where the 1st Brigade made their assault.  Rasbach refers to DeLacy’s testimony regarding the 1st Brigade’s subsequent movements in the days after their assault, and also gives a direct quote from Roebling, again with inappropriate and misleading insertions by the author, as “proof” that the 1st brigade, when they were sent to the Jerusalem Plank Rd. on June 20th, apparently had to travel some distance.  Rasbach offers this as if it somehow proves that the 1st Brigade was never at Rives’ Salient in the first place.  He has, apparently, forgotten Tilton’s testimony, which Rasbach presented previously on p. 76, that the 1st Brigade had already been withdrawn from the site of their assault to the vicinity of the Avery House on June 19th, making their trek to the Jerusalem Plank Rd. a bit of a distance.  I remind the reader again that Roebling’s report was not written until the end of 1864, some 6 months after the battle.  The movements of the 91st Pa of Sweitzer’s Brigade on June 21st is also irrelevant.  So are the many ways to spell the surname Cheever.  Also remember that the eventual footprint of the Federal fortification known as Ft. Hell was huge, stretching from straddling the Jerusalem Plank Rd. eastward to the area facing Rives’ Salient.  To my knowledge, neither JLC nor anyone else ever claimed that the 1st Brigade made an assault on the future site of Ft. Hell, but rather started off his assault on Rives’ Salient from the future site of Ft. Hell.  JLC merely stated that, in the process of driving an advanced Rebel field battery from that vicinity, he then dug in near the area that later became part of Ft. Hell.  Nor did JLC, or anyone else I know of, ever claim that Chamberlain and his brigade were on the Jerusalem Plank Rd.  The fact that elements of the 5th Corps had to drive Rebels skirmishers away from the Jerusalem Plank Rd. on June 21st, in my opinion, proves nothing and is irrelevant.

Pp. 81-83
You are required to accept Rasbach’s conclusion that Chamberlain did not attack at Rives’ Salient, but at the the future site of the Crater, in order to accept the further conclusions Rasbach believes he is drawing from Confederate Bushrod Johnson’s observations.  Though Rasbach fails to give us any hint of what time of day he is talking about, he declares that the Federal troops facing Johnson on June 18th were Griffin’s 1st Division [p. 81].  Meanwhile, Johnson himself, in an early morning diary entry, in no way identifies what Federals were in his front.  While asserting that Johnson’s account is similar to Major Roebling’s, Rasbach, having just told us that Griffin’s division was confronting Johnson [p. 81], then states that Cutler’s division was the first to advance to confront the new Rebel line [p. 82-83], with Sweitzer’s Brigade coming up mid morning [p. 83].  No mention by anybody of Chamberlain and his brigade.  Rasbach informs us that CW commanders did not synchronize their watches, and that is so.  We must therefore allow for discrepancies of fast or slow watches, let alone the proclivities of commanders who were anxious & fast off the mark, or, perhaps, painfully slow.  One must also keep in mind that day light savings time did not exist when relying on descriptions of sunrise, dawn, dusk, sundown, full dark, etc..  But difference in watches would never explain the failure of Sweitzer’s Brigade to support Chamberlain’s 3 p.m. assault.  Since all comers describe Sweitzer’s attack as occuring three hours later at 6 p.m., until reliable information or new testimony comes along, we’ll just have to ponder why the 2nd Brigade failed to make that 3 p.m. assault. Rasbach suggests that Johnson’s description of a Federal attack he received at 4 p.m. somehow accounts for both Chamberlain’s 3 p.m. attack and Sweitzer’s 6 p.m. attack, an unacceptable stretching of the three hour difference in the times of the two attacks27 in my opinion.  Rasbach nonetheless writes, “The Confederate observations of the mid-afternoon charge share uncanny similarities with what we know of the assaults by the brigades of Chamberlain and Hofmann, while the evening attack resembles the assault of Sweitzer’s brigade of Griffin’s 1st Division.”  Here Rasbach also doesn’t let us forget that he believes it was not only Chamberlain, but Cutler and his division as well who made a severe right turn while approaching the Rebel fortifications on the Federal left in order for Cutler’s Division to join Griffin’s Division, Crawford’s Division, and Burnside’s Corps in front of the future site of the Crater.

Pp. 84-89
Rasbach again quotes Thomas Chamberlin’s 1905 unit history of the 150th Pa. here [Rasbach mistakenly spells it Chamberlain.  I did this, too, in my book Chamberlain at Petersburg, but now I get to apologize!]. I’ll remind the reader again that Thomas Chamberlin was not at Petersburg, having mustered out weeks before.  Also, inexplicably Rasbach states that Lyman and Warren watched the 3 p.m. assault from the Avery house, despite Rasbach’s having already stated, that Lyman and Warren had ridden out onto a plain to observe the 3 p.m. assault at the middle of the 5th Corps line.  Rasbach insists that the attacks Confederate Bushrod Johnson received on the afternoon of June 18th can only be those made by Hofmann and Chamberlain for no other Federals advanced or attacked on that front.  In fact, Willcox and Potters’ Division, 9th Corps made an assault at 3 p.m.. [OR 40, I, pp. 523. 545]   Rasbach’s p. 85 map shows, incorrectly, only Hofmann and JLC assaulting while Willcox sits by passively, as does Ayers at Rives’ Salient.  There’s so much to disagree with, I hardly know where to start.  The map may be less whimsical regarding Willcox, Crawford and Sweitzer’s relative positions, but since Rasbach has offered, in my mind, neither relevant nor convincing supporting evidence to the contrary, I disagree completely with his and map maker Jespersen’s placement of Chamberlain, Cutler and Ayres.  Rasbach also quotes from and cites what is, from this historian’s point of view, the particularly offensive account of one Robert Carter of Sweitzer’s Brigade, author of Four Brothers in Blue.  Carter, though fully aware that Chamberlain and his brigade were shot to pieces in their unsupported 3 p.m. assault, nonetheless blames the failure of Sweitzer’s 6 p.m. attack on Chamberlain and the 1st Brigade’s failure to support 2nd Brigade.  Rasbach again offers the absent Thomas Chamberlin as evidence that some members of the 1st Brigade may have pitched in with the 2nd Brigade for their 6 p.m. attack, for T. Chamberlin describes that the fort JLC’s 1st Brigade assaulted was “the same that was blown up afterwards.” I’ll remind the reader again, that Thomas Chamberlin was not there, having mustered out some weeks before June 18th.  As further proof, that 1st Brigade men might have advanced with the 2nd Brigade at 6 p.m., Rasbach offers this quote from a 21st Pa. Cavalryman, “We got all mixed with another regiment on the brow of the hill.”  Not a terribly revealing or convincing bit of testimony, is it.  To continue, even though Rasbach offers a description by Lyman of Crawford making an assault with Sweitzer and the 9th Corps at 6 p.m., both of Rasbach’s maps [pp. 85 and 88] not only show Crawford completely in the rear of Sweitzer, but on the wrong side of the railroad cut, so apparently, in Rasbach and Jespersen’s minds, Crawford was not engaged, or as Rasbach puts it, perhaps it was “…Sweitzer (and some of Crawford’s men) attacking Ransom.”  Then again, Rasbach ponders whether the 9th Corps and Crawford may have been merely “present.”  How’s that for confusing?  Should we believe the quote, the author’s opinions, the maps, or none of the above?  Rasbach and Jespersen depict Sweitzer Brigade, including Rasbach’s grandpappy & the 21st Pa., as occupying a front line some 500 yds long as they prepare to sweep majestically across the plain, while two divisions of the 9th Corps, according to Rasbach, only get a 250 yd. front.

Pp. 90-94
It’s getting hard to believe that anyone is going to stick with me on this perilous fact and source checking journey!  Rasbach now provides various evidence regarding what day and time Kershaw and Field’s Divisions of the ANV arrived on the field, and where they were deployed.  JLC correctly believed, confirmed by conversations with Confederate veterans, that it was Kershaw’s men who manned the fortification at Rives’ Salient the day he attacked, though Chamberlain mistakenly wrote that Kershaw had arrived on June 17th, whereas he did not arrive until the morning of June 18th.  Rasbach himself, while suggesting what questions needed to be answered in his research, brings up the point of whether Chamberlain, Cutler and Ayers were the only AoP infantry unlucky enough to be confronting fortifications of the original Dimmock Line, as opposed to that part of the Rebel line that had quietly dropped back and hurriedly began to dig in early in the morning of June 18th on what became known as the Harris Line.  It’s a point of considerable interest to me.  Recollect that the Dimmock line contained so formidable a construction of works and batteries that it stopped two West point-trained engineers sent to attack them in their tracks, both Gens. Quincy Gillmore and Baldy Smith.  And again,  I can’t accept that anyone, let alone a rather clever fellow like Joshua Chamberlain, could mistake original Dimmock Line fortifications, like Rives’ Salient and the enfilading Ft. Mahone, for what holes and piles of dirt the Rebels were able to dig and throw up starting at 1 a.m. on June 18th. Noah Trudeau’s The Last Citadel, LSU, 1993, p. 13 and Earl Hess’s In the Trenches at Petersburg, University of No. Carolina Press, 2009, pp 11, 28-29, 32, give enlightening descriptions of the formidable nature of the Dimmock line fortifications.  A year in the making, the 10 mile long line of infantry parapets, 20 ft. at their base, and artillery emplacements were fronted by ditches 6-8 ft deep and 15 ft wide in front of their breastworks. Though bands of slaves had begun the digging in process in some places on the new Harris line during the night of June 17th-18th, in reality not a spade of dirt had been turned in most places.  So what amount of earth had the Rebels, who were lacking in tools, been able to displace since their 1 a.m. arrival on June 18th on the Confederates’ brand new Harris line, and how could it conceivably be mistaken for an original Dimmock Line fortification?   See Walter Clark’s Histories of the Several Regiments and Battalions from North Carolina, p. 363 for a good description of just how little the Rebels had been able to accomplish on their brand new line since their withdrawal from the Hagood line early on the 18th.  Also see “Memorable Days,” for a description of the Rebels’ new line in some places being only two feet high. http://www.beyondthecrater.com/resources/np/postwar-np/np-18700702-plantation-atlanta-gracie-brig-2nd-petersburg/ How can anyone question that someone would be unable to differentiate these feeble knee-high piles of dirt for the Dimmock Line fortifications?  And lastly, Rasbach’s statements, that the line opposing Warren’s 5th Corps was manned only by Bushrod Johnson’s Confederates (and only Johnson) is true only if you accept Rasbach’s premise that the entire 5th Corps was jammed into the Union line confronting the future site of the Crater.  I don’t agree.  While I’m willing to permit that Johnson did indeed man that gneral area of the Rebel line, and that some elements of Sweitzer, Crawford and the 9th Corps faced him during the day of June 18, I still believe the evidence shows that Chamberlain, Cutler and Ayers of the 5th Corps were confronting the original fortifications of the Dimmock Line, and therefore confronting the infantry of Confederate Gens. Kershaw and Field.

Pp. 95-96
I have some difficulty with Rasbach’s inconsistency when drawing our attention to and/or soliciting our possible skepticism regarding accounts written in the years after the war.  In the case of Chamberlain, Rasbach has been critical regarding JLC’s ability to remember details when writing his turn of the century accounts, while Rasbach encourages us to trust P.T. Beauregard’s accounts though they written 20 years after the war.  We have Beauregard’s description of his placement of Kershaw’s Division after their dawn arrival on the “new line already occupied by our forces with its right on or near the Jerusalem Plank Road, extending across the open field and bending back toward the front of the cemetery.” Beauregard’s statement is difficult to correlate with the undisputed nature of the Dimmock line fortification and the new Harris line which the Rebels fell back to in the early hours of June 18th.  Since the Harris line joined the original Dimmock Line at Rives’ Salient, it makes no sense to seemingly describe Kershaw’s deployment as being entirely on the “new line,” with that new line supposedly ending on or near the Jerusalem Plank Rd..  While we can accept that the location that Kershaw’s Division took up sounds right, it had less to do with their only being on the “new line.” I don’t think anyone disputes the original line and the Harris line positions, so I’m not sure how Rasbach considers that Beauregard’s testimony in some way helps clarify rather than confuse matters.  Rasbach then gives us Dickert’s version from a history of Kershaw’s Brigade, which gives a more accurate view, while Rasbach then returns to Beauregard to tell us of the arrival and deployment of Field’s Division on Kershaw’s right. Though in future Rasbach chapters, we will be assured that no one attacked Kershaw on June 18th, Dickert describes that Warren’s 5th Corps “made a mad rush” upon their works, and several hours of fighting insued.

Pp. 97-99
Rasbach’s description of the adjoining flanks of Kershaw’s and Fields Divisions meeting at Rives’ Salient is inaccurate, by Rasbach’s own proffered evidence of Dickert’s description of Kershaw’s right lying on the Jerusalem Plank Rd.  Also see Kershaw’s testimony on Susan Natale’s site, http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.com/virginia.php.  Rasbach provides us with a totally irrelevant map of Field’s later move from the ANV right flank, to the area of the Crater. How Field got to the field the morning of June 18th and where Field went on the night of June 18th sheds no light on the positions of Chamberlain, Kershaw and Field at 3 p.m..  Lastly, after considerable effort to establish Bushrod Johnson’s presence at the Crater site, along with Rasbach’s many attempts to convince us that Johnson was attacked by… let’s see… Chamberlain, Hofmann, Sweitzer, and perhaps Crawford and the entire 9th Corps… although Rasbach’s not sure about the last two.  But wait!  Last of all, on pp. 98-99, Rasbach quotes a Southern Historical Society paper by Bushrod Johnson which seems to be saying that Johnson sustained no attacks on June 18th, or only a very feeble one on one of Johnson’s brigades.  Let’s all take a break.  Have a drink!  Maybe even a strong drink!

Pp. 100-101
Rasbach asserts that there is no credible evidence of any major engagement involving Field’s division on June 18, and insists that this is further proof that JLC did not attack at Rives’ Salient. Rasbach’s reasoning here is extremely hard to follow, since he then promptly produces [pp. 100, 105], ample evidence from Dickert’s history of Kershaw’s Division that Field was, indeed, engaged on June 18th.  Dwelling on this issue is a lesson in futility, since, without supplying evidence, Rasbach disputes what everyone else I’m aware of accepts, that in the middle of the afternoon of June 18th, it was Ayers’ Division, not Chamberlain’s, that was on the AoP’s extreme left, thereby being the only Federals in any way confronting that part of the Rebel line occupied by Field’s Division.  Ironically, Rasbach and I can agree that Field sustained no attack there, since Ayers found his position too formidable to attack.  But since JLC attacked Rives’ Salient, manned by Kershaw’s Division, Rasbach’s statement regarding Field prove nothing regarding Chamberlain’s position.  Further assertions by Rasbach about JLC claiming to have been on the Jerusalem Plank Rd. are, once again, completely erroneous, for neither Chamberlain nor anyone else I know of ever claimed JLC was on the Jerusalem Plank Rd. on June 18.  Rasbach quotes Dickert’s history of Kershaw’s Division, “Before our division lines were properly adjusted, Warren’s whole corps made a mad rush upon the works, now manned by a thin skirmish line, and seemed determined to drive us from our entrenchments by sheer weight of numbers…. After some hours of stubborn fighting, and failing to dislodge us, the enemy withdrew to strengthen and straighten their lines and bring them more in harmony with ours.”  While this is a clear indication that Kershaw sustained a concerted attack by the 5th Corps, it is not accepted by Rasbach, who comments, “the fighting might have been heavier than an exchange of fire among skirmishers.”  I guess we must attribute this to an account Rasbach found in the diary of the colonel of 3rd S. Carolina of Kershaw’s Division who mentions only that after the early morning arrival of Col. Rutherford’s 3rd S. Carolinians, while on picket duty, their regiment was driven in, and though the enemy massed in their front, they did not attack.  Neither Rasbach, nor, apparently, the diarist, supply the all important time of day, and since nothing but a secondary source is provided, we mere mortals can’t follow up the evidence.  Nor is any information supplied as to just where on Kershaw’s line the 3rd SC was positioned.  It seems, from the testimony, highly likely that they were among those who manned the new Harris line, or assigned to the newly made Harris line.  Since there is no mention of Rebel skirmishers in front of Rives’ Salient, one can assume the diarist’s regiment was not deployed in front of Rives’ Salient or the Dimmock line fortifications to the west.  Why would they be?  No Rebel skirmish line was needed to delay the enemy’s rush upon those formidable works. Then Rasbach’s reference to Bryan’s Georgians, who, Rasbach tells us began immediately digging and throwing up earthworks, tells us that they were in the new line of works, for their digging in would have been entirely unnecessary if they had been assigned to works on the Dimmock line.  So the Georgians’ testimony athat Rasbach offers us proves nothing more than the likelihood that the Georgians were on the new Harris line, not where Chamberlain was in front of Rives’ Salient in the Dimmock line.  I’ll make the same observations regarding the testimony of Gen. Benjamin Humphreys which Rasbach offers.  While Humphreys mentions the “Jerusalem Road,” he also describes his men as being busy building breastworks, which would have been entirely unnecessary if they had been assigned to the original Dimmock Line works.

Pp. 102-105
Rasbach’s assurance that he found no evidence of an attack between Battery 34 and the Jerusalem Plank Rd. is irrelevant, since JLC was not on, nor did he ever claim to be on, that road or anywhere near Battery 34 on June 18th.  Rasbach’s comment regarding the absence of any Confederate report or recollections regarding attacks in that area is therefore equally irrelevant, and quite misleading, in my opinion.  I also disagree with Rasbach’s statement that Kershaw’s right flank and Field’s left flank met at Rives’ Salient.  Their flanks met at the Jerusalem Plank Rd. [See Chamberlain at Petersburg, p. 104, EN 14 for ample evidence] Of considerable relevance, however, is Gen. Porter Alexander’s testimony in his Military Memoirs of a Confederate p. 556, for it makes the statement regarding June 18th that, “No official report is given of any brigade except Hagood’s,….’”  So is it more a case of no official Confederate reports exist, as opposed to no Confederate reports detail an attack?  Meanwhile, by Rasbach’s own proffered evidence [see Dickert’s testimony on p. 100, and again on 105], Rasbach confirms that Kershaw sustained attacks on June 18th.  Since we do not accept Rasbach’s premise that Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade attacked 1.5 miles to the right of Rives’ Salient at 3 p.m. on June 18, I find Rasbach’s supply of copious details on Confederate troop movements at or to Pegram’s and Elliott’s Salients unhelpful and irrelevant.

Pp.  106-107
A difficult chapter, full of confusion and irrelevancy, concludes with more inapposite details of action at the future site of the Crater.  Kershaw’s and B. Johnson’s movements on the night of June 18th supply no evidence of their positions relevant to JLC’s 1st Brigade at the time of their 3 p.m. assault.  Furthermore, Rasbach, though he offers us no proof, or citations for that matter, insists that Rutherford’s 3rd So. Carolina pickets were stationed at the Jerusalem Plank Rd., and then points to Rutherford’s testimony that the line sustained no attack after their pickets were driven in. Rasbach thereby insists this is further proof that JLC did not attack at the Jerusalem Plank Rd.  No one, not I or Chamberlain or anyone else I know of claims or thinks that JLC and his brigade attacked on or in close proximity to the Jerusalem Plank Rd.  Sigh.

p. 108-111
Rasbach, once again, erroneously accuses me of placing JLC and his brigade on the Jerusalem Plank Rd on June 18.  Since I at no time suggested that this was the case at any time during JLC and his brigade’s advances, movements and assaults on June 18, I refute this, again, lest you have missed the many times I have previously noted this inaccuracy.  I’ll also repeat my reminder that the eventual footprint of Ft. Hell was very large, encompassing an area from barely straddling the Jerusalem Plank Rd. then extending 1,200 ft or 1/5 of a mile (further, if you count works shared with Ft. Rice) to the northeast in front Rives’ Salient.  All evidence and testimony makes it clear that JLC was not on the Jerusalem Plank Rd. before or during his 3 p.m. assault on June 18.  Sorry for this dreadful repetition, but we’re dealing with some pretty dreadful repetition in this book.  Rasbach then asks if Ayres and Cutler were already across the Jerusalem Plank Rd. on June 18, why would they have had to return there on June 21?  We don’t Cutler’s or Ayres’ testimony as to their precise locations at 3 p.m. on June 18th.  We do have Chamberlain’s testimony that while he was at Rives’ Salient, Cutler was to his left rear, and Cutler testifies that Ayers was on his left.  There is no evidence given or in existence that I know of for Rasbach’s assertion that Cutler was across the Jerusalem Plank Rd. on June 18th.  As for Rasbach’s questioning why Cutler and Ayers would have to return to the vicinity of the Jerusalem Plank Rd. several days later if they were already there, it is because after the fighting of June 18th, they were ordered to withdraw and moved away from that days battle line positions.  Since we do not have definitive proof of the exact positions Cutler, Ayres and Griffin withdrew to, this is a moot point.  Rasbach insists on using Roebling’s description of where Cutler was on the morning of June 18th to prove where he was at 3 or 3:30 p.m..  That doesn’t work.  Nor does quoting Wainwright regarding where Cutler was on the morning of June 18.  Cutler’s confusion about his and JLC’s orders for the afternoon assault offer no clarification regarding Cutler’s or Chamberlain’s positions prior to or during their assaults.  At least Cutler’s report, though not written until August 13th, almost two months after the events in question, testifies to Ayres being on Cutler’s left, with an explanation that Ayers did not make the assault because he received the order for a general advance too late to comply.
Rasbach now offers up Cutler’s report in an effort to prove, I suppose, that Cutler was where Rasbach insists he was at 3 p.m. on June 18th, heading towards Pegram’s or Elliott’s Salient along with Griffin’s and Crawford’s Divisions according to Rasbach’s map on his p. 85.  But since Cutler’s report does not state or in any way clarify exactly where he and his division were at 3 p.m. on June 18th, where Cutler ended up upon his withdrawal on the night of June 18th becomes irrelevant to where he was at the all important 3 p.m..  Cutler tells us that, after being ordered to withdraw from his 3 p.m. position, he eventually assumed a position between Griffin and Ayers, with Griffin on his right and Ayers on his left.  Cutler’s report then seemingly assures us that, once he dug in at this position, he remained there until the end of July.  Or did Cutler, maintaining a position between Griffin and Ayres shift to the vicinity of the Avery house as Tilton’s 1st Brigade [Griffin’s Division] did on the night of June 20th?  Let’s see if Tilton has anything to offer beyond his failure to pinpoint where Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade was for their 3 p.m. attack.  Rasbach, on p. 76, draws our attention to Tilton’s report [OR 40, I pp.-455-457].  Tilton, having assumed command of Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade, Griffin’s 1st Division, at dark on June 18th, wrote in his report that, on assuming command, he replaced the 1st Brigade’s 187th Pennsylvania with three regiments of Bartlett’s Brigade which had been sent up to support him.  Then, at 4 a.m. on June 19th, Tilton withdrew from the front to a position behind Bartlett’s Brigade, but apparently still within range of the enemy’s sharpshooters.  But we also have Tilton reporting that on the next day, June 20th, “at dark went to the rear and bivouacked near corps headquarter,” which was at the Avery House.   To add to the confusion of who was where and how long did they stay there, we have testimony in Bates’ History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, v. 2, p. 223, which informs us sometime before July 30th, Hofmann’s Brigade, Cutler’s 4th Division, had been temporarily assigned away from Cutler and attached to Ayers’ Division where they then took up a position in readiness to attack from somewhere just west of the railroad.  Another confused and confusing Rasbach observation is his assertion that during June 18th Cutler’s right was on the railroad cut, a position that Rasbach again and again erroneously assigns to Chamberlain and his brigade.
In summary, neither Cutler nor Tilton give evidence as to where the assaults of the 1st & 2nd Brigades of the 1st Division, or that of Cutler’s 4th Division took place at 3:00 p.m., 3:30 p.m. and 6 p.m. respectively.  Nor do they tell us the directions or routes of their withdrawals from their respective battle fronts, nor how far they withdrew.  Early on the night of the 18th and early in the morning of the 19th, Tilton and the 1st Brigade withdrew to a position to the rear of Bartlett’s Brigade, whose exact location is unknown except that it is, since Bartlett relieved the 1st Brigade, where JLC made his assault on June 18th at 3 p.m..  In addition we have testimony from Tilton that he and the 1st Brigade ended up by the night of June 20th somewhere near the Avery House.  We do not have any confirmation that Cutler, in order to maintain his position between Griffin and Ayres made the same sidling movements that Tilton and the 1st Brigade made [I believe that would have been a short movement or adjustment of their lines to the northeast, if you believe as I do that Chamberlain and Cutler made their 3:00 p.m and 3:30 p.m. assaults respectively on the original Dimmock Line fortification #25].  If Cutler did adjust his position to maintain his right’s connecting with the left of Griffin’s Division during June 19th and 20th, it would add credence to Cutler’s vague yet intriguing statement that the position to which he withdrew on the night of June 18th, the future site of the Crater was “a little to my right.”  Standing at 5th Corps HQ at the Avery House, facing towards the front towards the enemy’s lines, the future site of the Crater, according to Cutler’s description could conceivably be considered a little to his right.

Pp. 112-114
Rasbach’s confused attempt to define Ayres’ position on June 18th describes what I see as the impossibility of Ayres occupying a “space north of the captured works,” which would have Ayres’ Division apparently crammed into a wedge-shaped area between captured batteries 21-24 and the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad, an area that, additionally, is no where near “directly opposite, Rives’ Salient.”  Rasbach then draws our attention to the diary of one Lt. Henry Gawthrop with its hand-drawn map of the alleged position of the 4th Delaware, Hoffman’s Brigade, Cutler’s Division on June 18th.  While Lt. Gawthrop provides witness testimony, we must also acknowledge that Gawthrop and his regiment were brand new to the AoP, having arrived at Cold Harbor after having served mainly in guard duty assignments behind the lines and within the defenses of Washington.  Like many others, the 4th Delaware was snatched from their comfortable Washington billet and brought suddenly to the front as the AoP had been hemorrhaging men from day one of Grant’s Overland Campaign.  So, Gawthrop and his fellows were brand new to the sights and excitements at the front when Gawthrop drew a map in his diary, and Gawthrop, it must be remembered, lacked any training as a surveyor or topographical engineer that would make his hand drawn map in any way accurate or reliable.  His map must therefore be taken for just what it’s worth, i.e. not much.  Nor are we shown Gawthrop’s original map, but instead we are given Rasbach’s and Jespersen’s interpretation of Gawthrop’s map, which again offers neither a directional compass nor any indication of the time on June 18th that it is alleging to portray.  The map on p. 113 states, inexplicably, that, “The Otey designation is a reference point for descriptive purposes only, for the ANV battery had not yet arrived there on June 18th.”  Yet on p. 114, Rasbach assures us that it was this very battery, which hadn’t arrived yet on June 18th, that likely was the one who was showering enfilading fire on JLC’s left flank during his brigade’s 3 p.m. attack at the site where Rasbach imagines he was!
The evidence Rasbach next draws our attention to, Bates’ History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, published in 1870, in some ways suggests more questions than it provides answers.  The author Bates, not a veteran/witness, but an educator/historian, wrote this 5 volume set of unit histories for all the Pennsylvania regiments.  In his section regarding the 56th Pa. of Hofmann’s Brigade, Bates states that, at 3 p.m. on June 18th, the 56th Pa. and Hoffman’s Brigade attacked the Rebel line a quarter mile south of the future site of the mine (aka Elliott’s Salient) on the new Harris line.  But Bates also describes the 56th Pa. or some portion of Hofmann’s Brigade as reaching a position within 30 yds of the enemy’s entrenchments, while Cutler says his divisions nearest approach to the Rebel line was 70 yds.  Most interesting was Bates’ description of Hofmann’s Brigade having been assigned temporarily away from Cutler to Ayres’ Division on July 30, the day of the Battle of the Crater, at a position in a covered way west of the railroad.  This information impacts on the report of Cutler that Rasbach offers which fails to take into account that Cutler’s Division did not remain intact throughout the month of July, or, significantly, on July 30th.  [See my notes above for pp. 108-111]  Relying, apparently, solely upon amateur mapmaking efforts of diarist Gawthrop, Rasbach makes, in my view, a lot of unwarranted assumptions about the lengths of Hofmann’s and Chamberlain’s battle line, let alone their positions.  Rasbach once again insists that his version, as opposed to Chamberlain’s, is the only possible scenario for June 18th.  I disagree, for all the reasons given above. Rasbach also seems to be suggesting that the place where JLC made his 3 p.m. attack is the same place where JLC and Griffin made their daring reconnaissance the morning of June 18th, quite a puzzling suggestion given that JLC was on the other side of the railroad cut when he and Griffin made that reconnaissance, yet how many times has Rasbach insisted that JLC’s right was on the railroad cut during his 3 p.m. assault?
Rasbach again, unfortunately, refers to the “‘Otey’ redoubt,”… you know, the one where there wasn’t a battery on June 18th, so it couldn’t have been providing the enfilading fire on Chamberlain and his brigade during their 3 p.m. assault as Rasbach suggests.  We are, regardless of that error, expected to accept Rasbach’s observations as somehow proving that Chamberlain was squashed in between Cutler and Sweitzer, “with his right flank on the Deep Cut of the railroad….”  The capital letters applied to “Deep Cut” are there at Rasbach’s nonsensical insistence that term only applies to that part of the cut near the Baxter Rd., as opposed to the other miles of deep railroad cut to which many of the day’s witnesses refer.  Once again, I point out that neither Chamberlain nor any one else I know of but Rasbach claimed or claims that JLC’s right was on and remained on the railroad cut.  Rasbach again asks us to believe that Ayres, Cutler’s, Griffin’s and Crawford’s Divisions of the 5th Corps were all squashed into the line less than a mile in length, while the well-manned Confederate fortifications full of Rebels from Rives’ Salient to the west remained either dangerously unnoticed and inexplicably unchallenged.   Rasbach is overwhelmed by the evidence.  I am underwhelmed.

Pp. 115-116
Rasbach, once again, declares that Ayres’ position earlier on June 18th in the vicinity of Rives’ Salient, does not prove where Ayres’ Division was at 3 p.m..  Wainwright’s report confirms nothing more than that Rittenhouse, Rogers and Walcott’s Batteries were with Ayres when he was near Rives’ Salient before noon on June 18th.  Rasbach’s addition of the words “[Rives Salient]” to Warren’s 1:10 p.m. order is not justified by any evidence given, for Warren could well have been desirous that Ayres attempt to silence the terrible destructive powers of Ft. Mahone and any of the other Rebel batteries to the west of Rives’ Salient.  Rasbach also draws our attention to correspondence between Ayres and Warren at 9 p.m. the night of June 18th that plainly locates Ayres at the former Rebel batteries #22-24.  Where Ayers was at 9 p.m. on the night of June 18th proves nothing regarding where he was at 3 p.m. that day.

Pp. 117-120
Finally, in Chapter 13, Rasbach gives some attention to where Burnside’s 9th Corps fought on June 18th!  On first hearing of Rasbach’s insistence that Chamberlain fought near the future site of the Crater, my very first thought was, “Where the heck does he think the 9th Corps fought on June 18th?  Rasbach, in the first page of this chapter [p. 117], announces his intention to prove that it was none other than Griffin’s Division that secured the area where the Federal tunnel to place the mine was dug, and which then became the jumping off place for the 9th Corps’ ill-fated Battle of the Crater on July 30th.  While it is known that the 2nd Brigade of Griffin’s Division, Sweitzer’s Brigade, along with Crawford’s Division of the 5th Corps were on the 9th Corps left and/or rear during the day of June 18th, it’s the position of Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade that Rasbach disputes.  Rasbach comments that no one disputes that the entire 9th Corps was north of the Baxter Rd. on June 18th, but then so is the future site of the Crater, so no argument there.  But Rasbach also asserts that no less than 7 unit histories, 3 of them from JLC’s own brigade, confirm that JLC fought at the Crater site, not at Rives’ Salient.  Let’s have a look.
Rasbach first cites Horatio Warren’s unit history for the 142nd Pa., published in 1890.  While Rasbach draws his readers’ attention only to p. 37 of Warren’s account, where Warren describes the position of the 1st Brigade as being at the future site of the Crater before it was relieved by the 9th Corps.  But the movements Warren details in his pages before that statement may cast doubt on the nature and relevancy of that testimony, and cast doubt on whether it confirms Rasbach’s fondest theory.
Starting on p. 34, Warren recollects the 1st Brigade’s first engagement on June 18th with the words, “By one o’clock we had driven the enemy about one mile in a fair, open field engagement, and had forced them back into their last line of works around Petersburg.”  Warren describes the alignment of 1st Brigade’s regiments for their efforts to drive Rebel skirmishers from the woods on their left, and attempt to outflank and capture an advanced Confederate battery.  Warren remembers with pride that his regiment, the 142nd Pa, was, at first, in the center of JLC’s second line in this first advance, but upon Chamberlain’s orders, and despite being under heavy fire, he and his men cooly moved from JLC’s second line of battle to the first.  Though Chamberlain was disappointed that they had been unable to capture the Rebel battery, Warren was apparently satisfied that they had succeeded in driving the enemy over a hill, “and through a ravine, and on top of the opposite bank of this ravine, about fifty feet back, was situated their last line of works, into which they had taken refuge, and which were bristling with artillery, the guns in our front being twenty to forty feet apart.”  I draw the readers’ attention to Warren’s employing the word “works,” for is it not an abbreviation of breastworks or earthworks, such as those at Rives’ Salient, as opposed to the hastily constructed defenses on the new Harris line where Rasbach would have us believe JLC fought.  See Noah Trudeau’s The Last Citadel, LSU, 1993, p. 13 for an illustrative description of the formidable nature of the Dimmock line fortifications such as the one at Rives’ Salient.  A year in the making, the 10 mile long line of infantry parapets and artillery emplacements were fronted by ditches 6-8 ft deep and 15 ft wide in front of their breastworks. Though some preliminary digging was done by slaves on June 17, for the most part, when the Rebels abandoned their Hagood line at 1 a.m. on June 18th, they retired to a line where, for the most part, not a spade of earth had been turned, nor did they have the tools to start the job.  So Warren’s use of the word “works” hardly seems an an apt description of the amount of earth the Rebels had been able to displace on the Confederates’ brand new Harris line.
Let’s follow the 1st Brigade’s movements on the morning and afternoon of June 18th in order to examine Rasbach’s challenge to where JLC and his 1st Brigade fought at 3 p.m. on June 18th. What is of considerable significance is that all witnesses, participants and recorders of the 1st Brigade’s movements and advances on June 18th, describe them as two quite separate advances and attacks.  Launched from the vicinity of the Avery House that morning, Chamberlain’s drove Rebel skirmishers from the woods on his regiment’s left in preparation to making a flank attack upon an advanced Confederate field battery. Warren goes on to describe the 1st Brigade’s second advance that day, the assault on Rives’ Salient.  Warren’s observation that the brigades on their right and left broke and retreated is puzzling, since Hofmann’s position and farthest advance is believed to be to the left, but well to the rear of JLC’s battle line.  Were Warren’s comments regarding the brigades to the right and left of the 1st Brigade reliant upon hindsight?  For one must also consider Horatio Warren’s letter to JLC, July 7th, 1888, once again available thanks to the generosity of Susan Natale’s site and its comprehensive collection of Chamberlain archival material, see http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.com/warren1888.php.  In this letter, Warren offers a caveat to his commentary of watching the brigades on the 1st Brigades left and right, with the words, “and my support did not arrive,” which has been added in a superscript, same hand, same ink.  It’s a comment which rather lays to rest the idea that Warren could actually see the brigades (Hofmann to the left, and Sweitzer to the right) that were supposed to have supported the 1st Brigade, but didn’t.  Meanwhile, it seems unlikely that Warren would see Sweitzer position, at some distance off Chamberlain’s right where the 2nd Brigade occupied a position to the left of Crawford and the 9th Corps’ position confronting the enemy at the vicinity of Elliott’s or Pegrams’ Salient.
To continue with Warren’s account, he describes that after their failed 3 p.m. assault, some portion of the 1st Brigade remained on the field in front of the enemy in hastily dug trenches sheltering them from fire from both their front and the enemy’s right.  The rest of the brigade, at around 3 a.m. the next morning, June 19th, withdrew from the battlefield.  And here’s where Warren’s succinct descriptive powers may or may not mislead us, for he describes, “We were instructed to retire across the ravine as quietly as possible and build a line of works on the brow of the hill from which we charged” [my italics here].  Is Warren talking about the jumping off point of the 1st Brigade’s first advance, near the Avery House, or the brigade’s second advance of the day, a launching area for their 3 p.m. assault somewhere on the large footprint of the future Ft. Hell? It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that Warren was talking about their having retiring to that crest that had sheltered them immediately before their 3 p.m. advance, but there is evidence, such a the unit history of the 149th Pennsylvania of Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade, that by late June 18th or early June 19th, they were back at the railroad cut, or in closer proximity to the Avery house than to their afternoon position in front of Rives’ Salient. Or as Rasbach points out [p. 76] from Col. Tilton’s report, the 1st Brigade’s gradually withdrew from their June 18th front, at 4 a.m. on June 19th taking up a position behind Bartlett’s Brigade which replaced the 1st Brigade on the battle line. Then, as Tilton reported, the 1st Brigade made a further withdrawal on June 20th to the vicinity of the Avery house.  Now Warren’s description of the 1st Brigade eventually being relieved by the 9th Corps, from a position near the Avery house, begins to make sense, along with Horatio Warren’s description confirming that the site they relinquished to the 9th Corps was the very site where the tunnel for the mine was constructed by the 9th Corps.  Rasbach takes this to mean, or even prove, that Chamberlain and his 1st Brigade remained in the vicinity of the Avery House, and/or confronting the Rebels on their new Harris line, for the duration of June 18th.  This theory ignores all testimony, including Horatio Warren’s, that their morning advance against the Rebel field battery, was a movement to the left, away from the Avery house, the Taylor farm, Sweitzer’s Brigade and Crawford’s Division.  And, of course, we must not forget the actual evidence of which units confronted and occupied the future site of the Crater on June 18th… namely, from right to left, the 9th Corps, and Crawford’s Division and Sweitzer’s Brigade of the 5th Corps.
For another one of his dissenting regimental histories, Rasbach again offers the testimony of Thomas Chamberlin, the author of the 150th Pennsylvania’s unit history.  As for this “witness,” I’ll repeat my caution to the reader as I have with Rasbach’s previous references to his testimony, Thomas Chamberlin [Rasbach again misspells Thomas Chamberlin’s surname] was not at Petersburg on June 18th, having resigned some weeks earlier.  We are therefore looking, not at the testimony of a witness, but at a secondary account from an unknown source.  Bates’ History of Pennsylvania Volunteers offers testimony of a similar quality, in that the author, an historian/educator, was not a veteran or witness to the day in question, and we’ve no way of knowing the source or sources, or the reliability, of his information.  The quotation from the 121st Pa history in no way confirms that regiment’s position or that of the 1st Brigade’s during June 18th.  Nor does the 121st’s subsequent movements after June 18th clarify matters in any way.  Meanwhile, the testimony offered by members of Sweitzer’s Brigade, while confirming their presence near the future site of the Crater, in no way confirms the presence of JLC and the 1st Brigade at or adjacent to that position.
Rasbach next presents Parker’s and Carter’s history of the 22nd Mass., which makes the erroneous statement that Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade’s “had assaulted with us,” ignoring the fact that the Sweitzer’s 2nd Brigade didn’t make their advance until 3 hours after the 1st Brigade’s assault.  Though acknowledging that JLC’s 1st Brigade’s had previously been repulsed, and that Chamberlain had been wounded, it goes on, nonetheless, to make the callous remark that the members and commander of the 1st Brigade, though many of them were already lay dead or bleeding upon their battlefield, were somehow at fault for not protecting the 2nd Brigade’s exposed left flank.
How far was the gap between JLC and Sweitzer?  Close enough that both brigades’ apparently wished, without having their wishes fulfilled, that the support that was supposed to have been on the right and left would materialize.  But Chamberlain describes the gap between his right and Sweitzer’s left as having been a most significant one.  While JLC expressed real concern regarding his exposed left flank, lest the enemy come out of their fortification and take advantage of his vulnerability on that flank, he was far less concerned regarding his right flank, for an extensive stretch of swamp preclude in JLC’s mind the threat of any Rebel incursion from that direction.  Since we have no indication that Sweitzer was in a swamp, I’m betting that Sweitzer was, in fact, some little distance away from JLC’s right flank.  In fact, I believe, as does Rasbach, that Sweitzer and his 2nd Brigade were way over by Elliott’s or Pegram’s Salient, as O.B. Knowles testimony also confirms.  But we still have no reason to believe, let alone any proof, that Chamberlain was there, too.  I find it pointless to address or refute, as Rasbach does here, what were, after all, Trulock’s conjectures on the length of Hofmann’s and Chamberlain’s battle lines.
In the continuing effort to discount and/or discard all of Chamberlain’s testimony, Rasbach now offers the suggestion that he was confused by the clamor of battle, in spite of the fact that many witnesses have described Chamberlain’s calm demeanor and ability to think clearly under fire.  JLC’s best friend, the grizzled veteran and West Point trained artilleryman, Gen. Charles Griffin, described JLC as one of the coolest men in battle that he had ever seen.  Then Rasbach suggests that Chamberlain was must have been “reeling” from his wound, which was, inarguably, a serious one.  But despite that wound, remember that JLC was, nonetheless, able to write a touching and coherent letter to his wife and family after arriving at the division hospital on June 18th. [Joshua Chamberlain Papers, Special Collections, Bowdoin College].
Pp. 121-124
Rasbach’s Chapter 14, entitled “Memories Contradicted: Twitchell’s 7th Maine Battery”
Rasbach expends a whole chapter on Chamberlain’s description of Twitchell’s Battery in his book, Passing of the Armies, which Rasbach suggests offers proof that JLC wasn’t at Rives’ Salient for his 3 p.m. assault.  I suggest that it isn’t proof, but an example of Chamberlain waxing eloquent over his memories.  JLC was remembering seeing his old Bowdoin friend Twitchell with his Battery at Petersburg on the morning of June 18th.  We may, perhaps, pardon Chamberlain for his emotional response to that memory awakened by seeing Twitchell, for before that day was done (though not at the exact moment he was seeing Twitchell, mind you) JLC had reason to believe he wouldn’t live to see another day.  Twitchell served with Willcox’s Division, Burnside’s 9th Corps, and there’s every reason to believe that Chamberlain and Twitchell had encountered one another on the morning of June 18th in the vicinity of the Avery house.  Personally, I don’t take JLC’s writing to mean, as Rasbach does, that he was literally looking at Twitchell when he received his near mortal wound at Rives’ Salient.  Since Twitchell reports his position in the afternoon of June 18th as being to the right and rear of the Taylor house, not even the far-sighted Chamberlain could have been seeing his friend Twitchell at the hour of his wounding.  Rasbach casts further aspersions on Chamberlain’s “clouded consciousness,” and, in Rasbach’s opinion, awards JLC a memory as “flawed after so many years.”  Or try on Rasbach’s suggestion that Chamberlain was “spatially disoriented in an unfamiliar setting, especially amidst the smoke and clouds of battle and the dimming of his aging consciousness.”  These idle unsubstantiated speculations are followed with Rasbach’s mind-blowing observation, “Despite inconsistencies such as these, it is remarkable how accurate Chamberlain’s recall was regarding the movements of his command and the appearance of the battlefield from his vantage point on the ground.”  So which is it… befuddled, confused old man or astute observer of a battlefield horizon that was undoubtedly seared into Chamberlain’s memory?

Pp. 125-126
Rasbach’s Chapter 14 “Understanding the Battlefield: The Terrain Never Lies”
The terrain, according to Rasbach, never lies, but I’ll assure the reader that it surely does change.  The area formerly known as Rives’ Salient and Chamberlain’s approach to it was bulldozed some time ago, and now contains a housing development, and what had been a shopping center is now a large church and parking lot.  In his intro to this chapter, Rasbach does not share with us just which topographical maps he festooned with tongue depressors and dried butter beans in his efforts to disprove Chamberlain’s writings that describe his brigade’s position was in advance of the rest of the 5th Corps with his left flank was in the air.  But since Rasbach continues to insist that JLC’s right flank was at the railroad cut, something neither Chamberlain or anyone else I know of claims, this argument goes nowhere.  Forgive the repetition, but because of Cutler’s being well to JLC’s left rear, the 1st Brigade’s flank was indeed in the air.  Despite the considerable gap between the 1st Brigade’s right and Sweitzer’s left, Chamberlain had less concern about his right flank, since, as previously stated, he considered the swampy nature of the ground in the gap would prevent any sudden Rebel incursion in that area.

P. 127
I have no idea what Rasbach’s heading, “Leading from the Right, Moving to the Right,” is supposed to mean, though it may refer to a DeLacy remembrance of JLC at some point in the 3 p.m. advance being on the right of his line, something no one else claims.  But to continue, since Rasbach’s statement on pp. 33-34, he has seemingly changed his mind about in what direction JLC’s 1st Brigade went when they took their first steps to outflank and capture the advanced Rebel battery that had been harassing the 1st Division on the morning of June 18th.  They did indeed first go to their left.  But after Chamberlain dislodges the Confederates, Rasbach, though he doesn’t explain why he thinks this, insists that JLC’s “next goal was almost certainly to move back to the right and join up with the other assaulting brigade of his division under Sweitzer, which was attacking north of the Baxter Road.”  With complete disregard for Chamberlain’s several descriptions of his hunkering down right where he was after dislodging the enemy battery, somewhere on the future footprint of Fr. Hell, and somewhere within striking distance of the works at Rives’ Salient.  Rasbach, offering no evidence to dispute this, nonetheless insists that JLC then tuned right and made a beeline for Sweitzer.  The DeLacy quote offered here sheds no light on 1st Brigade position.                                                                                                                                                              Jumping ahead to the 3 p.m. assault, Rasbach gives us his version of JLC’s 3 p.m. attack.  If you are at all familiar with Chamberlain’s description of how and why he acted as he did leading his 1st Brigade’s attack on Rives’ Salient, Rasbach’s “take” on what happened and what JLC should have done may, as it did for me, leave you with your mouth hanging open.  Chamberlain described that when the soldier next to him, who was carrying the 1st Brigade’s pennant, was shot down, Chamberlain picked it up and brandished it so that his men would see it aloft with their commander.  But Rasbach’s description, while mistaking the flag JLC picked up and carried as being the brigade’s colors, or American flag, rather than the brigade pennant, goes on to question whether any of what Chamberlain described actually happened.  Rasbach writes, “If in fact Chamberlain advanced with the flag, it is fair to wonder about his motivation.  He was the brigade commander, after all, not a color-sergeant.  Chamberlain’s proper position was behind the advancing lines so he could oversee his entire brigade.  At the front of the charge, with a large banner in hand, his ability to effectively direct his command, or even to see much of it, would have been severely compromised, and it was dangerous to carry a flag into battle.  Perhaps Chamberlain felt the moment was such that the objective could be achieved by nothing other than such inspiration.”  Yes, maybe that’s what Chamberlain thought, Dennis Rasbach.

Pp. 128-131
Chamberlain’s position relative to his battle lines is only unclear if you completely disregard and discount his own testimony.  No matter how many times Rasbach insists on these points, neither Chamberlain’s right flank, nor Bigelow’s battery was at the deep cut just prior to the 1st Brigade’s 3 p.m. assault, and we’ve been offered no proof to support that theory, only Rasbach’s conjectures or misinterpretation of the testimony.  Don’t know why Rasbach’s thinks Bigelow was to the right rear of the 1st Brigade instead of more centrally behind them, nor why he has JLC drifting to the right of his line during the assault.  Rasbach goes on to deny that any stream or swampy area existed between the 1st Brigade and Rives’ Salient.  I don’t know what period maps Rasbach is using to substantiate that claim, or perhaps his butter beans obscured an important detail, but our period maps clearly show that there was a branch of Poor Creek in front of Rives’ Salient.  Along with his erroneous denial of the existence of stream or swamp in front of Rives Salient, and the irrelevant assertion that there are no swampy areas near the Jerusalem Plank Rd., Rasbach’s again insists that JLC must have been encountering Taylor Creek at 1.5 miles to the right on the Federal line at Pegram’s or Elliott’s Salient.  With the absence of any clear or convincing evidence, I see this claim as nothing more than Rasbach’s mistaken opinion.  The gap in the Federal line where the Baxter Rd and stream tributaries pass through is hardly “mysterious.”  Nor does the gap, or “discontinuity” as Rasbach likes to call it, prove that there were no other wetlands or swamps in the battlefield landscape.  Rasbach’s repeats his citing of Horatio Warren’s description of the 142nd Pa, 1st Brigade’s being relieved by 9th Corps troops.  I’ll repeat that the 1st Brigade’s removal to the vicinity of the Avery house after their afternoon assault on June 18th, and their later relief by the 9th Corps doesn’t provide any evidence for the location of Chamberlain’s 3 p.m. attack.  For a more complete consideration and discussion of the significance of Warren’s testimony, see see my clarification for pp. 117-120 above.

Pp. 132-142
Rasbach finally addresses the quite important question of how, if JLC was with Sweitzer 1.5 to the right, Chamberlain was receiving enfilading fire from a large fort on his left.  We’re given a totally irrelevant sketch of Federal artillery positions for July 30th, 1864.  Rasbach does not address the significant and recognizable difference between what a well-established fortification and its batteries in the original Dimmock line could throw at you, as opposed to a field piece bouncing along behind a team of horses and hurriedly brought up to the enemy’s brand new Harris line.  And that’s not even mentioning mistaking a fort or salient of the original Dimmock line fortifications as opposed to the newly dug trenches, holes and knee high mounds of earth on the Harris line.  Rasbach’s argument that Chamberlain mistook Rebel field guns for those of Fort Mahone is unconvincing.  So is Rasbach’s additional argument that perhaps Chamberlain mistook firing from Rives’ Salient for that of Fort Mahone, for that idea demands that you first accept that JLC was with Sweitzer at the Crater before you can consider this imaginative conjecture.  I’ll merely comment that Mahone and Rives’ Salient had plenty to targets to shoot at much closer to on their own fronts, as opposed to flinging their shots at targets 1.5 miles away down on the Federal right at the future site of the Crater.  Rasbach himself, in defense of his mistaken idea that Ayres’ Division rather than JLC was at Rives’ Salient at 3 p.m. on the 18th, draws our attention to Ayres’ own 9 p.m., June 18th report that clearly states that Ayres had been exchanging fire with the formidable batteries on his own front, one much farther to the Federal left than Rasbach would have us believe.  For Rasbach insists that it was Ayers, not Chamberlain, who was at Rives’ Salient at 3 p.m. on June 18th, the same Ayres’ who was exchanging artillery fire with the large fort on his front.  Yet Rasbach suggests that, rather than exchanging fire with Ayres’ division in their front, the Rebel guns at Rives’ Salient were probably throwing fire at Chamberlain’s Brigade, a mile and a half to their left.  Such “evidence” makes a nonsense Rasbach’s assertions for Ayres’ and Chamberlain’s positions.  As for the possibility of anyone mistaking Rives’ Salient for Ft. Mahone, there is also the matter of the latter having the distinction of being detached, and lying roughly 1/8 of a mile south of the Dimmock Line, while Rives’ Salient provided a much different profile, lying firmly within the original line.  So not an easy mistake to make, as Rasbach mistakenly suggests.
Rasbach goes on to suggest that some objections [including that of Chamberlain scholar Susan Natale and my own] have been raised regarding his theories of where everybody was at 3 p.m. on June 18, 1864.  Rasbach suggests that the argument is “there was not sufficient space to accommodate all the units that claimed to have been there.”  I think Rasbach completely misapprehends the objections that are being raised.  It is not at all a matter of there not being enough room for all the units “that claimed to have there,” as Rasbach puts it.  It is a matter of there not being enough room for all the units that Rasbach claims were there.  Rasbach is suggesting that 6 Federal divisions were squashed into a battlefront of 2,200 yds or 1.25 miles.  Rasbach attempts to manage this inexplcable pile up of everyone in one place with his map on p. 67, which shows Potter’s Division behind Willcox [although Potter was engaged on June 18th], putting Crawford behind Sweitzer [although Crawford was engaged that day], and allowing Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade, more than 2,100 men, only a 300 yard front.  Even with JLC’s men placed in two lines, that would still be allowing only a foot per soldier on the line.  (I’ve heard of the shoulder to shoulder in battle lines, but these guys would have had to walk sideways.)  So while Rasbach does acknowledge, to some degree, the presence of the 9th Corps, Crawford’s Division and Sweitzer’s Brigade, and various batteries at or near the Crater site, he does not offer, nor has he offered, any plausible evidence for the presence of Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade being there as well. Though Rasbach lists Earl Hess’s In the Trenches at Petersburg in his bibliography, it is one of many sources Rasbach has chosen to ignore that give evidence that it was the 9th Corps who was fighting in front of Pegram’s or Elliott’s Salient, the future site of the Crater, on June 18th.  [See Hess, pp. 29-33]
Rasbach again advances his opinion that Ayres’ Division was at Rives’ Salient at 3 p.m. rather than Chamberlain’s Brigade.  I repeat, where Ayres might have been at noon on June 18th, does not prove where he was at 3 p.m..  It also interesting to consider that, if Ayres maintained a position northeast of Jerusalem Plank Rd., why did the Confederates invest Field’s Division, filling the Dimmock Line and its fortifications on Kershaw’s left, if there was no nearby Federal presence or threat?  Meanwhile, Meade was letting his left flank hang in the air, inviting the Rebels to come out of their fortification and roll up his line.
Rasbach goes on to consider evidence of Crawford’s positions and movements during June 18th, although Rasbach’s maps don’t really reflect or account for the fact that Crawford’s Division advanced with the 9th Corps and fought on the Federal “front,” at various times during the day.  The OR, pt. 2, pp. 185-186, indicates that on June 18th, Crawford was in direct contact with the enemy at 7:35 a.m., and again before 11:15 a.m., before Crawford was ordered to retire, but to continue to maintain contact with “Gen. Griffin’s right [I would interpret that as Sweitzer’s right, and note, that is not saying in Sweitzer’s rear].  Crawford was again ordered to the front as Rasbach notes, for an 8 p.m. assault that was cancelled.  Additional testimony in the form of regimental histories seemingly confirm that Crawford was indeed actively engaged on June 18th, though inexplicably, by pp. 140-142 Rasbach is asserting that Crawford didn’t do much on June 18th if anything at all, additionally making the claim that Crawford was not only away from the front, but on the wrong side of the railroad cut again with only a few of his regiments near the 9th Corps.  He offers Crawford’s report [OR pt. 1, 472] as “proof” that Crawford didn’t do anything on June 18 because he only talks about what he did on June 17.  Meanwhile, our only hint of how Rasbach thinks Crawford might have managed to get to the front where the fighting was, is his map on p. 144.  With no claim to be illustrating a particular time frame, the map is entitled “Grand Scheme,” and shows Crawford’s Division, … remember this is a whole division,… apparently having to squeeze through a roughly 200 yd. gap between the 9th Corps and Sweitzer to get to the front where the fighting is.  Rasbach merely comments, “The area would have been very crowded indeed.”   Rasbach again insists that Chamberlain was in this maelstrom of troops in front of the future site of the Crater.  It seems very clear to me that the evidence Rasbach has provided doesn’t even come close to proving this.

Pp. 143-145
Rasbach’s Chapter 17, “Summary: The June 18 Evidence Speaks for Itself”
I state that the evidence Rasbach has offered to prove his theories has failed to convince this reader, as it should, in my opinion, fail to convince any knowledgeable reader.  First of all, Rasbach suggests that Joshua Chamberlain and his 1st Brigade did not attack the enemy at Rives Salient on June 18, 1864, but instead making their assault 1.5 miles away further to the right.  Rasbach reminds us of his theories as to where the 5th Corps Divisions were distributed, and illustrates them with his map on p. 144, entitled “Grand Scheme.”  While Ayres provided information of his positions at midday and at night on June 18th, I see the Rasbach’s argument for the position he assigns Ayres at the all important 3 p.m. is unsubstantiated and indefensible.  Rasbach’s positioning of Cutler is, apparently, based solely upon the diary of Lt. Gawthrop, with it’s map of Hofmann’s Brigade’s position.  While we are asked to place great confidence in the map-making skills of the green soldier Gawthrop, who possessed no surveying of engineering training, we are not even shown Gawthrop’s map, but given Rasbach’s and mapmaker Jespersen’s interpretations of it.  If I must rely on either Chamberlain’s or Gawthrop’s testimony as to Cutler’s position, I’m afraid the only logical thing to do is to go with Chamberlain.  I’m also unaware that Cutler or any member of his division has ever given any testimony that they headed for or near the future site of the Crater, nor am I aware of any member of Cutler’s division expressing disagreement with Chamberlain’s testimonies.  Thus, I completely disagree that Rasbach’s conclusions, and the map that reflects them, are in any way accurate for the positions of Ayres and Cutler’s division, and Chamberlain’s Brigade at 3 p.m. on June 18th, 1864.

Pp. 146-149 – A summary of Rasbach’s evidence
Rasbach has provided no proof for his repeated statements that Chamberlain and his 1st Brigade were on Sweitzer’s immediate left at 3 p.m on June 18th.  I’m consistently startled by Rasbach’s insistence on calling the area around the future site of the Crater the “Horseshoe.”  It’s a term I’ve only ever heard applied to the infamous Horseshoe at Spotsylvania, but if that’s what Rasbach wants to call it…. The fact that 9th Corps troops eventually relieved 5th Corps troops after their withdrawal to the vicinity of the Avery House does nothing to prove where they were at 3 p.m. on June 18th.  See my notes for Rasbach’s pp. 78-80.  Rasbach, while applying his own beliefs regarding where the 5th Corps left and center were at 3 p.m., quotes Warren’s description of his center making an assault as if it proves where JLC was.  It does not.  Rasbach, contrary to his own description [see Rasbach’s pp. 65-67] of Warren and Lyman riding out to view the 3 p.m. assaults, states here that they were watching from the Avery House.  Rasbach’s statement that Bushrod Johnson, 1.5 miles to JLC’s right, was attacked at 4 p.m. by Federals with a two line formation, in no way proves, as Rasbach would have it, that Johnson was attacked by Chamberlain.  You know, in some ways it seems that while JLC did offer us substantial description [See Chamberlain at Petersburg “Reminiscences,” pp. 78-92], the members of his brigade and those adjacent to them seemingly didn’t think to offer substantial, definitive evidence of just where they fought on June 18, 1864.  Would it be because they never dreamed they would have to?  Would it be kind of like Lincoln having to provide evidence of where he gave the Gettysburg Address?  While Rasbach has tenaciously followed the shaky testimonies of those who seemingly disagreed with Chamberlain, Rasbach has chosen to ignore or discount the testimony of those who agree.  [For instance, consider James Gibb’s unit history of the 187th Pa., which names the Rebel fort at Rives’ Salient as the site that the 1st Brigade attacked at 3 p.m. on June 18th.  Rasbach lists Gibbs in his bibliography, but ignores this important testimony. Gibbs, James, History of the First Battalion Pennsylvania Six Months Volunteers & 187th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Regiment. Harrisburg, PA Survivors’ Assoc., 1905, p. 96]  Rasbach reminds us of Confederate witnesses who seemingly deny any assault at Rives’ Salient (it’s tempting to consider that the 1st Brigade’s costly 3. p.m. assault was so easily brushed aside that the Rebels thought very little of it.)  But we must also consider Porter Alexander’s testimony, that there are no Confederate reports in existence for any brigades but Hagood’s, not for Kershaw, the Rebel division JLC believed he attacked on June 18th.  See my notes for Rasbach’s pp 102-105.
Rasbach’s repeats his expressions of skepticism regarding the reliability of JLC’s memory since some of his testimony wasn’t written down or recorded until “the last two decades of his life,” while Rasbach apparently disparages what he calls “the frequent repetition of those statements over the past century by various biographers and other writers.”  I’m somewhat amused by Rasbach’s insistence on pointing out that upon Chamberlain’s gaining ripe old age of his 60s and 70s he was a candidate for possible mental infirmity. I do believe Rasbach is in his 60s, as am I, and I hope neither one of us has outlived our usefulness in the intellectual reasoning and remembering departments.  Rasbach also draws our attention to the seriousness of Chamberlain’s wound, though again I remind the reader that Chamberlain, upon arriving at his division’s field hospital, wrote a moving and coherent letter to his wife and family that still exists in Bowdoin College Special Collections.  That he came near dying at Annapolis Hospital during his two month confinement there is not to be denied, but there is no indication that that in any way caused Chamberlain to forget his Petersburg experience or suffer any memory loss.  Remember, Chamberlain, immediately after the war, went on to be governor of Maine, then president of Bowdoin College.  No indication of an diminution of his mental powers there.  Also, I’ll remind the reader, again, that JLC, in preparation for writing a history of the 5th Corps, started sending out solicitations in 1866 seeking testimony from battlefield witnesses, including those who participated in the fighting on June 18, 1864.  So while Rasbach reminds us incorrectly that Chamberlain did not return to the battlefield at Petersburg until some 18 years after the battle, he is ignoring the fact that JLC was back with the 5th Corps, AoP, by November of 1864, a few months after the battle.  It is true that it was not possible for JLC to revisit the ground at Rives’ Salient at that time, for that part of the Federal line, was one of the most dangerous, having soon earned its nickname “Ft. Hell.”  But to suppose that, when he was once again with the commanders and men of the 5th Corps, the subject and discussion of the details of June 18th never came up is unimaginable.  So it’s my opinion that a great injustice is being done to Chamberlain by Rasbach’s insinuations that JLC did not bother to collect and retain information, discuss the subject with anyone, or apparently even think about the events of June 18th until he was an old man, too old to be relied upon.
Here follows another repetition of Rasbach’s “proofs.” (1)  Rasbach erroneously insists that JLC states that his right flank was in or on the railroad cut.  He did not say that, nor did I, nor did anyone else I know of but Rasbach and this cited source, the mistaken Thomas Howe. (2)   Rasbach’s insists, again, that the icehouse JLC described was on his immediate right.  It wasn’t.  He also insists that an icehouse on the Taylor Farm was the icehouse, an unproved assumption on his part.  See my notes above for Rasbach’s pp.  53-55.  (3) I’m assuming that Rasbach’s reference to DeLacy’s description of a stream or boggy area in their front, one that Rasbach denied existed in front of Rives’ Salient, though he does not mention that denial here, proves, in his mind, that the 1st Brigade was at the Crater, not Rives’ Salient.  That claim is based solely on Rasbach’s denial of the existence of a stream or wet area in front of Rives’, which we found prominently marked on period maps.  I’m not sure how Rasbach missed that. (4) Rasbach’s refers to JLC’s writing in Passing of the Armies about remembering his friend Twitchell’s Battery on June 18th at Petersburg.  Rasbach interprets JLC’s words as meaning that Twitchell was actually in Chamberlain’s field of vision when he was shot, an occurrence not possible from where JLC was at Rives’ Salient and with Twitchell with the 9th Corps.  I, familiar with what sometimes is his florid Victorian prose, interpret it as JLC’s remembering having seen his friend on the morning of that fateful day when he came near dying.  (5)  These proofs of Rasbach’s only work if you accept his two faulty premises that the Taylor icehouse was the only icehouse anywhere in the vicinity, an unlikely situation given the prevalence of icehouses in Virginia in the 1800s. See my notes for Rasbach’s 57-60.  We would also have to accept the icehouse which JLC described as being on his right front, was immediately adjacent to his right flank. There is no proof of that.  (6) With no evidence to back it up other than his surmise that the batteries that were with Griffin had to be 5th Corps batteries that were assigned to Griffin, Rasbach has made the erroneous assumption that it was Phillips, Stewart and Richardson’s Batteries that JLC’s 1st Brigade was called upon to defend in the morning on June 18th.  He goes on to compound that error by insisting that Chamberlain and his men followed the Phillips, Stewart and Richardson batteries to they position on the Baxter Rd..  As we can see from the fact that it was the unassigned batteries of Bigelow, Barnes and Hart that ended up with JLC at Rives’ Salient, it was often whatever battery was near by and not unengaged that would get pulled into action when time was of the essence.  (7) Colonel Tilton has proved to be an unreliable witness, and one who we suspect had some real axes to grind as far as Chamberlain and the 1st Brigade were concerned.  See page 3 of my notes above for a consideration of the Tilton baggage. The Knowles’ letter that Rasbach insists confirms that JLC and his 1st Brigade were on Sweitzer’s immediate left is of no use, because Knowles fails to name what time during the day he remembered seeing Chamberlain on Knowles’ regiment’s left. (8)  Rasbach returns to his original acknowledgement that Lyman and Warren left the Avery house and went out onto an open plain to watch the 3 p.m. assault.  See my notes for Rasbach’s p. 84.  (9) All of Rasbach’s “evidence” here hinges upon our acceptance of Gawthrop’s amateur efforts at mapmaking and describing topography in order to prove that Hofmann’s Brigade was at the Crater.  Since we don’t accept or endorse Gawthrop as a sufficiently reliable witness, it negates the rest of what Rasbach offers here.  Bigelow’s testimony only confirms that he was in the rear of and supporting Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade during their 3 p.m. assault, but in no way endorses Rasbach’s theory that Bigelow and Chamberlain were any place other than Rives’ Salient.  The same goes for Cols. Hofmann and Tilton, who in no way confirm that JLC was anywhere but at Rives’ Salient.  (10) What movements the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, 5th Corps made after June 18th in no way confirms where they were at 3 p.m. on June 18, 1864.  (11)  Rasbach repeats his assertion from his text on pp. 117-120 that 7 regimental histories confirm that the 1st Brigade fought at the future site of the Crater, not at Rives’ Salient.  In case you missed my response to it above, I’ve copied and pasted my response here in bold type for your reading pleasure.  Please forgive the repetitive details of my response, but we’re dealing with a very repetitive book.  I feel compelled to comment that, no matter how many times you repeat a mistaken conclusion, it is still a mistaken conclusion.
Repeat of my notes for Rasbach’s Pp. 117-120
Finally, in Chapter 13, Rasbach gives some attention to where Burnside’s 9th Corps fought on June 18th!  On first hearing of Rasbach’s insistence that Chamberlain fought near the future site of the Crater, my very first thought was, “Where the heck does he think the 9th Corps fought on June 18th?  Rasbach, in the first page of this chapter [p. 117], announces his intention to prove that it was none other than Griffin’s Division that secured the area where the Federal tunnel to place the mine was dug, and which then became the jumping off place for the 9th Corps’ ill-fated Battle of the Crater on July 30th. While it is known that the 2nd Brigade of Griffin’s Division, Sweitzer’s Brigade, along with Crawford’s Division of the 5th Corps were on the 9th Corps left and/or rear during the day of June 18th, it’s the positions of Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade that Rasbach disputes.  Rasbach comments that no one disputes that the entire 9th Corps was north of the Baxter Rd. on June 18th, but then so is the future site of the Crater, so no argument there.  But Rasbach also asserts that no less than 7 unit histories, 3 of them from JLC’s own brigade, confirm that  JLC fought at the Crater site, not at Rives’ Salient.  Let’s have a look.              Rasbach first cites Horatio Warren’s unit history for the 142nd Pa., published in 1890.  While Rasbach draws his readers’ attention only to p. 37 of Warren’s account, where Warren describes the position of the 1st Brigade as being at the future site of the Crater before it was relieved by the 9th Corps.  But the movements Warren details in his pages before that statement may cast doubt on the nature and relevancy of that testimony, and cast doubt on whether it confirms Rasbach’s fondest theory.  
Starting on p. 34, Warren recollects the 1st Brigade’s first engagement on June 18th with the words, “By one o’clock we had driven the enemy about one mile in a fair, open field engagement, and had forced them back into their last line of works around Petersburg.”  Warren describes the alignment of 1st Brigade’s regiments for their efforts to drive Rebel skirmishers from the woods on their left, and attempt to outflank and capture an advanced Confederate battery.  Warren remembers with pride that his regiment, the 142nd Pa, was, at first, in the center of JLC’s second line in this first advance, but upon Chamberlain’s orders, and despite being under heavy fire, he and his men cooly moved from JLC’s second line of battle to the first.  Though Chamberlain was disappointed that they had been unable to capture the Rebel battery, Warren was apparently satisfied that they had succeeded in driving the enemy over a hill, “and through a ravine, and on top of the opposite bank of this ravine, about fifty feet back, was situated their last line of works, into which they had taken refuge, and which were bristling with artillery, the guns in our front being twenty to forty feet apart.”  I draw the readers’ attention to Warren’s employing the word “works,” for is it not an abbreviation of breastworks or earthworks, such as those at Rives’ Salient, as opposed to the hastily constructed defenses on the new Harris line where Rasbach would have us believe JLC fought. See Noah Trudeau’s The Last Citadel, LSU, 1993, p. 13 for an illustrative description of the formidable nature of the Dimmock line fortifications such as the one at Rives’ Salient.  A year in the making, the 10 mile long line of infantry parapets and artillery emplacements were fronted by ditches 6-8 ft deep and 15 ft wide in front of their breastworks. Though some preliminary digging was done by slaves on June 17, for the most part, when the Rebels abandoned their Hagood line at 1 a.m. on June 18th, they retired to a line where, for the most part, not a spade of earth had been turned, nor did they have the tools to start the job.  So Warren’s use of the word “works” hardly seems an an apt description of the amount of earth the Rebels had been able to displace on the Confederates’ brand new Harris line.
Let’s follow the 1st Brigade’s movements on the morning and afternoon of June 18th in order to examine Rasbach’s challenge to where JLC and his 1st Brigade fought at 3 p.m. on June 18th. What is of considerable significance is that all witnesses, participants and recorders of the 1st Brigade’s movements and advances on June 18th, describe them as two quite separate advances and attacks.  Launched from the vicinity of the Avery House that morning, Chamberlain’s drove Rebel skirmishers from the woods on his regiment’s left in preparation to making a flank attack upon an advanced Confederate field battery. Warren goes on to describe the 1st Brigade’s second advance that day, the assault on Rives’ Salient.  Warren’s observation that the brigades on their right and left broke and retreated is puzzling, since Hofmann’s position and farthest advance is believed to be to the left but well to the rear of JLC’s battle line.  Were Warren’s comments regarding the brigades to the right and left of the 1st Brigade reliant upon hindsight?  For one must also consider Horatio Warren’s letter to JLC, July 7th, 1888, once again available thanks to the generosity of Susan Natale’s site and its comprehensive collection of Chamberlain archival material, see http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.com/warren1888.php.  In this letter, Warren offers a caveat to his commentary of watching the brigades on the 1st Brigades left and right, with the words, “and my support did not arrive,” which has been added in a superscript, same hand, same ink.  It’s a comment which rather lays to rest the idea that Warren could actually see the brigades (Hofmann to the left, and Sweitzer to the right) that were supposed to have supported the 1st Brigade, but didn’t.  Meanwhile, it seems unlikely that Warren would see Sweitzer position, at some distance off Chamberlain’s right where the 2nd Brigade occupied a position to the left of Crawford and the 9th Corps’ position confronting the enemy at the vicinity of Elliott’s or Pegrams’ Salient.  
To continue with Warren’s account, he describes that after their failed 3 p.m. assault, some portion of the 1st Brigade remained on the field in front of the enemy in hastily dug trenches sheltering them from fire from both their front and the enemy’s right.  The rest of the brigade, at around 3 a.m. the next morning, June 19th, withdrew from the battlefield.  And here’s where Warren’s succinct descriptive powers may or may not mislead us, for he describes, “We were instructed to retire across the ravine as quietly as possible and build a line of works on the brow of the hill from which we charged” [my underlining here].  Is Warren talking about the jumping off point of the 1st Brigade’s first advance, near the Avery House, or the brigade’s second advance of the day, a launching area for their 3 p.m. assault somewhere on the large footprint of the future Ft. Hell? It would be easy to jump to the conclusion that Warren was talking about their having retiring to that crest that had sheltered them immediately before their 3 p.m. advance, but there is evidence, such a the unit history of the 149th Pennsylvania of Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade, that by late June 18th or early June 19th, they were back at the railroad cut, or in closer proximity to the Avery house than to their afternoon position in front of Rives’ Salient. Or as Rasbach points out [p. 76] from Col. Tilton’s report, the 1st Brigade’s gradually withdrew from their June 18th front, at 4 a.m. on June 19th taking up a position behind Bartlett’s Brigade which replaced the 1st Brigade on the battle line. Then, as Tilton reported, the 1st Brigade made a further withdrawal on June 20th to the vicinity of the Avery house.  Now Warren’s description of the 1st Brigade eventually being relieved by the 9th Corps, from a position near the Avery house, begins to make sense, along with Horatio Warren’s description confirming that the site they relinquished to the 9th Corps was the very site where the tunnel for the mine was constructed by the 9th Corps.  Rasbach takes this to mean, or even prove, that Chamberlain and his 1st Brigade remained in the vicinity of the Avery House, and/or confronting the Rebels on their new Harris line, for the duration of June 18th.  This theory ignores all testimony, including Horatio Warren’s, that their morning advance against the Rebel field battery, was a movement to the left, away from the Avery house, the Taylor farm, Sweitzer’s Brigade and Crawford’s Division.  And, of course, we must not forget the actual evidence of which units confronted and occupied the future site of the Crater on June 18th… namely, from right to left, the 9th Corps, and Crawford’s Division and Sweitzer’s Brigade of the 5th Corps.
For another one of his dissenting regimental histories, Rasbach again offers the testimony of Thomas Chamberlin, the author of the 150th Pennsylvania’s unit history.  As for this “witness,” I’ll repeat my caution to the reader as I have with Rasbach’s previous references to his testimony, Thomas Chamberlin [Rasbach again misspells Thomas Chamberlin’s surname] was not at Petersburg on June 18th, having resigned some weeks earlier.  We are therefore looking, not at the testimony of a witness, but at a secondary account from an unknown source.  Bates’ History of Pennsylvania Volunteers offers testimony of a similar quality, in that the author, a historian/educator, was not a veteran or witness to the day in question, and we’ve no way of knowing the source or sources, or the reliability, of his information.  The quotation from the 121st Pa history in no way confirms that regiment’s position or that of the 1st Brigade’s during June 18th.  Nor does the 121st’s subsequent movements after June 18th clarify matters in any way.  Meanwhile, the testimony offered by members of Sweitzer’s Brigade, while confirming their presence near the future site of the Crater, in no way confirms the presence of JLC and the 1st Brigade at or adjacent to that position.
    Rasbach next presents Parker’s and Carter’s history of the 22nd Mass., which makes the erroneous statement that Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade’s “had assaulted with us,” ignoring the fact that the Sweitzer’s 2nd Brigade didn’t make their advance until 3 hours after the 1st Brigade’s assault.  Though acknowledging that the JLC’s 1st Brigade’s had previously been repulsed, and that Chamberlain had been wounded, it goes on, nonetheless, to make the callous remark that the members and commander of the 1st Brigade, though many of them were already lay dead or bleeding upon their battlefield, were somehow at fault for not protecting the 2nd Brigade’s exposed left flank.
How far was the gap between JLC and Sweitzer?  Close enough that both brigades’ apparently wished, without having their wishes fulfilled, that the support that was supposed to have been on the right and left would materialize.  But Chamberlain describes the gap between his right and Sweitzer’s left as having been a most significant one.  While JLC expressed real concern regarding his exposed left flank, lest the enemy come out of their fortification and take advantage of his vulnerability on that flank, he was far less concerned regarding his right flank, for an extensive stretch of swamp preclud in JLC’s mind the threat of any Rebel incursion from that direction.  Since we have no indication that Sweitzer was in a swamp, I’m betting that Sweitzer was, in fact, some little distance away from JLC’s right flank.  In fact, I believe, as does Rasbach, that Sweitzer and his 2nd Brigade were way over by Elliott’s or Pegram’s Salient, as O.B. Knowles testimony also confirms.  But we still have no reason to believe, let alone any proof, that Chamberlain was there, too.  I find it pointless to address or refute, as Rasbach does here, what were, after all, Trulock’s conjectures on the length of Hofmann’s and Chamberlain’s battle lines.
    In the continuing effort to discount and/or discard all of Chamberlain’s testimony, Rasbach now offers the suggestion that he was confused by the clamor of battle, in spite of the fact that many witnesses have described Chamberlain’s calm demeanor and ability to think clearly under fire.  JLC’s best friend, the grizzled veteran and West Point trained artilleryman, Gen. Charles Griffin, described JLC as one of the coolest men in battle that he had ever seen. Then Rasbach suggests that Chamberlain was must have been “reeling” from his wound, which was, inarguably, a serious one.  But despite that wound, remember that JLC was, nonetheless, able to write a touching and coherent letter to his wife and family after arriving at the division hospital on June 18th. [Joshua Chamberlain Papers, Special Collections, Bowdoin College].  

(12) Rasbach repeats  what seems to me his pointless invention of “Roebling’s Rule,” which I assert should be properly named “Rasbach’s Rule,” since it seems to me the astute veteran Roebling would have been unlikely to have uttered such a trite banality.  Rasbach wants us to embrace the idea that short advances over favorable terrain are apt to succeed.  Conversely, long advances over unfavorable will probably fail.  Since JLC’s assault on Rives’ Salient was a long advance over unfavorable terrain,  (as JLC was quick to point out, by the way), Rasbach therefore insists that JLC did not attack at Rives’ Salient.  I can’t follow this logic.  Can you?  I also hate to see it attributed in any way to Washington Roebling, a soldier, scout and engineer I greatly admire, and hope to return to writing about when I finish considering Rasbach’s research and writing.  I feel in this, Rasbach’s 12th point of his summation, that he is, once again, calling Chamberlain’s veracity into question.  How else can we interpret Rasbach’s unsupported insistence that JLC could not have done what he said he did, where he said he did it.  (13) Bushrod Johnson’s report that he was attacked by someone at 4 p.m. on the afternoon of June 18th gives no indication what Federal force attacked him, and proves nothing.  As for Rasbach’s reference to Anderson’s Diary of the Confederate 1st Corps, I’ll save you the trouble of having to track that done, and give you the entry here. “At 3 A. M. Kershaw moves for Petersburg, followed [505] by Field. Pickett occupying the whole line. We arrive at Petersburg, and Kershaw relieves Bushrod Johnson’s division — Field taking position on Kershaw’s right. A feeble attack is made in the afternoon on Elliott’s brigade of Johnson’s division.”   As you can see for yourself, this entry does not reveal nor confirm the all important times of arrivals and movements for Kershaw and Field, nor their positions and movements on June 18th.  Rasbach assures us in his text that Kershaw did not relieve Bushrod Johnson until sometime in the evening of June 18th, for whatever that’s worth.  The information that a “feeble attack is made in the afternoon on Elliott’s brigade of Johnson’s division,” proves absolutely nothing.  (14)  The silence by Gens. Kershaw and Field as for their silence regarding any attacks being sustained by them on June 18th may well be explained by Gen. Porter Alexander’s assurance that no reports were available from these commanders.
While Rasbach assures us that his “inquiry is not in any way intended to impugn the courage, heroism, intelligence, honesty or integrity of the Lion of the Union “  [It’s kind of hard to know where this “Lion” thing got started.  Chamberlain’s most hagiographic biographers entitled his book Soul of the Lion, and such sites as https://christianrenewal.wordpress.com/articles/the-soul-of-the-lion-the-heart-of-the-woman-joshua-lawrence-chamberlain-and-the-battle-of-gettysburg/ that attribute this quote about Chamberlain to Gen. Daniel Sickels, of all people: “General, you have the soul of the lion and the heart of the woman” — Union Brevet Major General Horatio G. Sickel to Brevet Major General Joshua Lawrence…) But to return to Rasbach’s assurances that he has no wish to diminish Chamberlain’s reputation or call into question his veracity.  Rasbach insists he questions only one point, where JLC attacked on June 18th, 1864.  Rasbach goes on to suggest that, given the ordeal of the wound JLC endured on June 18th, 1864, Chamberlain’s “confusion is understandable.”  Rasbach also suggests that this confusion is also caused by the amount of time Chamberlain let pass before “putting pen to paper.”  But Rasbach, inisisting that JLC didn’t record anything before the turn of the century, chooses to ignore the written testimony of both JLC’s explicit description in his June 18, 1864 “line before Petersburg” letter, as well as Chamberlain’s 1882 letter to his sister shortly after his visit to the battlefield. While Rasbach has, I’m guessing, reached the same ripe old age that I have, (I’m 67), I hope we haven’t passed our years of usefulness and intelligent reasoning.  And since there is no evidence that suggests otherwise, I see no reason to question a man of Chamberlain’s intellect, when in his 60s and 70s, to be able to recall the details of one of the most significant events of his life.                                                                                                                                                               Rasbach further suggests that the “recollection of a single observer on a specific point, especially when we [sic] there are official documents that contradict it in ways large and small, should never be accepted without question.”  I suggest that where that single observer is the commander who led the approach to and organized and led the assault in person, one should give it considerable attention and weight, and subject any conflicting testimony to substantial scrutiny.  The sorts of criteria I use as a CW reseacher and writer to evaluate testimony and the reliability of witnesses include, was the witness there, or are they reporting second hand accounts.  Does the witness’s testimony change over time.  Does the witness have an ax to grind or a reputation they are anxious to change or protect?  Does the witness have the expertise and experience, as well as sufficient access to the site and events to legitimately evaluate and report on that it? When held to these sort of standards, the witnesses who Rasbach employs to provide the “conflicts” he feels challenge Chamberlain’s accounts, as well as those who agree with Chamberlain, do not stand up well.  It is my opinion that only when there is plausible and reliable “fresh evidence,” will it be time for further consideration of Chamberlain’s assault on Rives’ Salient.   And why does Rasbach fail to acknowledge those sources that agree with Chamberlain, and present only those that do not?  Consider James Gibb’s unit history of the 187th Pa., which names the Rebel fort at Rives’ Salient as where the 1st Brigade attacked at 3 p.m. on June 18th.  Rasbach lists Gibbs in his bibliography, but ignores this important testimony. [Gibb’s, James History of the First Battalion Pennsylvania Six Months Volunteers & 187th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteer Regiment. Harrisburg, PA Survivors’ Assoc., 1905, p. 96]  I suspect that those members of Chamberlain’s 1st Brigade who penned memoirs and unit histories of what they witnessed on June 18th, 1864, the last thing on their minds was needing to prove where they were at the time of their assault on June 18.  It does not surprise me, therefore, that by their very silence regarding Chamberlain’s graphic depictions of the 1st Brigade’s assault at Rives’ Salient is, in essence, proof of their tacit approval and endorsement.

Pp. 150-152
Rasbach’s Chapter 18 entitled, “Even Heroes Make Mistakes: Smoke, Clouds, and Confusion”
While pointing out the obvious, that combat creates chaos and confusion, Rasbach makes the odd observations that, for any given soldier, “Trying to figure out your precise location on the battlefield and the identity of opposing infantry units,” is of secondary importance to a soldier’s two primary goals: first, to “achieve his objective,” and second, to “stay alive while doing so.”  While Rasbach is offering platitudes on what motivates soldiers on the battlefield, I suggest that the mind of a brigade commander might be a good deal more focused on the details of the upcoming battle than the private who has little more to do than follow orders. I would also suggest that any competent commander, like JLC, will be giving extensive attention to exactly where he is on the battlefield, and he will want to know all he can about who his opponents are, if he wishes to gain what Rasbach suggests are primary goals.  Then, too, Rasbach is apparently unaware of Chamberlain’s remarkable reputation for remaining calm and cool on the battlefield, even when under severe fire.  Consider Little Round Top as an example.  I’ll refer the reader to my Chamberlain biography, Fanny and Joshua, pp. 345-6] for testimony regarding Gen. Griffin’s assessment of Chamberlain’s coolness when under pressure and under fire.  Gen. Charles Griffin was a West Point trained regular army veteran who did not suffer fools gladly, and who recommended JLC, as did their corps commander, Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, for rapid advancement.  After the war, at a time when the shrinking Federal army had a very limited number of slots for officers in the regular army, Gen. Warren recommended that Chamberlain be retained as an officer.
Rasbach observes that Chamberlain’s wounding on June 18th left no time for him to contemplate the scene of his fight after the battle, a deficit that Rasbach asserts negates Chamberlain’s ability to take advantage of what he (Rasbach) feels is the all important after battle contemplation.  I wonder how many brigade commanders actually have time after a battle to put up their feet, fill their pipes, pour a dram and talk over the battle with their chums?  Rasbach goes on to instruct us, “Perspective needs time to grow and develop, usually through serial observations…” and “Context involves fitting things in their proper relationship in time and space.”  Nor did Chamberlain, according to Rasbach, have an opportunity for an after battle discussion, whereupon Rasbach suggests the likelihood of the wounded JLC being in a “stupor,” and/or becoming unconscious.  Chamberlain’s writings make it quite clear, though his wound was a very serious one, that far from being in a stupor or unconscious, he argued with the artillerymen in his stretcher party that carried him off the field.  Then he argued with the doctors who wanted to take a private off the operating table to start to work on JLC.  Lying together among the wounded at the 1st Division’s field hospital, JLC was speaking with his friend, Col. George Prescott of the 32nd Massachusetts of Sweitzer’s Brigade, who later died.  On the night of June 18th, Chamberlain also was aware of and spoke with numerous visitors to the hospital, including commanders of the 5th Corps who most likely spoke of the day’s events. [A partial list includes Gen. Griffin, 1st Div. 5th Corps,  Gen. Warren, 5th Corps commander, and Gen. Bartlett, 3rd brigade commander, 1st Divison, 5th Corps, whose Brigade was behind JLC’s 1st Brigade acting as his reserve.  Chamberlain also received visits from Maj. Ellis Spear, Dr. Abner Shaw, and JLC’s brother Tom Chamberlain, all of the 20th Maine, who were on the battlefield with Bartlett’s 3rd Brigade.  Chamberlain also spoke with Cpl. James Stettler, 143rd Pa, of JLC’s 1st Brigade, and Col. George Prescott, 32nd Massachusetts, Sweitzer’s Brigade, and with Dr. Wm. DeWitt and other first division surgeons who were known to JLC.   Dr. Morris Townsend, 44th New York, a 3rd Brigade surgeon, spent considerable time that night attempting to treat Chamberlain, who at some point also managed to write a coherent and moving letter to his wife and family [Bowdoin Special Collections].   So I disagree with Rasbach’s supposition that JLC, because of his wound, somehow missed out on the opportunity to, as Rasbach puts it, “… reevaluate his initial perceptions, formed in smoke and chaos, against the standard of unclouded reality.”  It’s my opinion that, far from being fuzzy about where he was, what he was seeing and what happened on June 18th, this was a day Joshua Chamberlain was unlikely to ever forget.  I also suspect that the horizon at Rives’ Salient with the steeples of Petersburg beyond was one that was seared into his memory.
Rasbach now returns to his bad old habit of asserting that JLC did not return to Petersburg for 39 years, or not until 1903 using Rasbach’s math.  In fact, as we know and Rasbach should know, Chamberlain was back with the 1st Division, 5th Corps, Army of the Potomac, by November of 1864, and was with them in the last months of the war in 1865.  And, of course, and Chamberlain returned and toured the battlefield at Petersburg in 1884.  Let’s get it right!  Rasbach nonetheless insists that, “The fact that his accounts were compiled so long after the event makes them less reliable than those of nearly everyone else who wrote about the places and events of June 18th.”  No matter, apparently, that a number of the sources upon whom Rasbach depends for details that he believes conflict with JLC’s account were also written by witnesses many years after the event, or, in several cases, by people who weren’t there at all.
So, we are instructed by Rasbach to ignore the fact that JLC was the commander who led his brigade to the location from which he organized and led the assault.  Also we are told to pay no attention to the fact of his being a highly intelligent officer, known for his cool-headed ability to think clearly under the most extreme conditions.  Also, we’re not to take into account the evidence of Chamberlain being pretty feisty and alert despite his life threatening wound.  We are asked to forget all of that as Rasbach delivers his assessment: “As a result, Chamberlain was one of the least qualified of the observers that day when it came to commenting on the question of where his attack took place.”  I keep forgetting Rasbach’s ability to astonish me, but he continues to do so with statements like these.               Rasbach again suggests that, unlike other veterans, Chamberlain never bothered to talk with other witnesses, though, as Rasbach knows, JLC began contacting other participants in 1865, a practice he continued for the rest of his life, in preparation for a history of the 5th Corps, a project that got delayed because of Chamberlain’s busy life after the war.  Chamberlain was also a member and officer in numerous nationwide veterans’ groups, where he was a much-called upon popular speaker.  So, it becomes more and more clear to me that there is no basis for Rasbach’s statement that JLC never talked with anyone else regarding his attack at Rives’ Salient, and it becomes equally clear to me that whatever controversy exists regarding where Chamberlain fought on June 18th is one that is manufactured by, and inadequately defended by, Dennis Rasbach and Bryce Suderow.

Pp. 153-161
Rasbach’s Chapter 19 “For Posterity’s Sake: Setting the Record Straight”
Rasbach’s statement, that he set out to establish the whereabouts of a single brigade, in a single engagement on a single day of the Civil War,” leaves me asking the question, “Why?”  If the one brigade Rasbach had focused your attention upon had been his ancestor’s brigade it would make slightly more sense, but that’s not what this is all about.  Rasbach has spent most of his time and energy working very hard, and in my opinion unsuccessfully, to disprove the accounts of the brigade next to that of his ancestor’s, the men under the command of Col. Joshua Chamberlain.  But why?  Why did Rasbach seemingly turn away from his great grandfather’s brigade only to turn his eyes toward JLC, a young professor, of all things, who had already been labelled a hero because of his performance at the Battle of Gettysburg.  But remember Chamberlain’s reputation was and one of very stark contrast to that of Granddad’s brigade, the 2nd Brigade’s and it’s commanders Sweitzer and Tilton, whose reputations were tarnished by their poor performance at Gettysburg.  Nor are their reputations enhanced by the unexplained failure of the 2nd Brigade to obey the orders to advance and support the JLC’s 1st Brigade in their 3 p.m. attack on June 18th.  Thus, the only incentive I can conceive of for Rasbach’s insistent attack on the history and record of Chamberlain and his 1st Brigade is, I’m guessing, the desire to somehow burnish the record of his ancestor’s brigade by tarnishing and diminishing the role played in the battle by their neighbors.  Rasbach again mistakenly declares that JLC did not fight at Rives’ Salient, but at Pegram’s Salient, and that Chamberlain’s right flank was at or in the railroad cut.  Having provided wholly inadequate evidence, no matter how many times he repeats these theories, he has not proven them to be true.  Though repetition does nothing to make his points more relevant or reliable, Rasbach yet again repeats all the “evidence” he feels favors his version of what happened on June 18th.  I’ll refer the reader to my notes above on Rasbach’s first summary of his evidence on his pages  146-149 to avoid treating you yet again to my response to these same points.                                            On p. 156, Rasbach begins his efforts to prove that it was Sweitzer’s Brigade who captured some part of  the ground that can be described as the future site of the Crater.  Rasbach insists on calling the area, “the Horseshoe,” although I know of no one else who calls it that.  Rasbach quotes from Roebling, and I’ll mention again that this is not Roebling’s “Diary,” as Rabach insists on calling it, but from a report Roebling wrote in December of 1864, recollecting what he observed during the Overland Campaign, from Culpepper to Petersburg.  I am perfectly happy to accept that some part of Griffin’s division, namely Sweitzer fought at or near what could be considered the future site of the Crater.  But I do not accept that this, in any way, offers proof that JLC and his 1st Brigade, Griffin’s Division, were there as well.                                                                                   On Rasbach’s p. 157, he cites Under the Maltese Cross, a unit history of the 155th Pa. of Sweitzer’s Brigade, known for its infamous unreliability.  For instance, as Susan Natale points out on her website  http://www.joshualawrencechamberlain.com/155pa.php.   in her assessment of the work, unlike the account given by this tome, Chamberlain, while grievously wounded, did not lose his leg at the Battle of Petersburg, nor can they be relied on considering their frequent confusion of brigade numbers and dates.  But Rasbach nonetheless offers the assertions of the155th’s quite fallible history to assure us that it was the 155th Pa. and Sweitzer’s Brigade whose advance on June 18th was the “high water mark of the charge of Meade’s army.” [Under the Maltese Cross 295-296]  And with his comment “Despite their failure to penetrate the interior lines of the Confederate defense at Petersburg….,” Rasbach seems to also imply that Sweitzer came within a whisker of capturing Petersburg!  You know, I can’t be bothered to argue about who, among the many, many brigades, divisions and corps of the Army of the Potomac, it was that left their dead nearest the Rebel line.  Who knows, maybe it was Sweitzer’s Brigade, and Rasbach can glory in the fact that his ancestor’s brigade finally redeemed themselves from their failures in other battles, and their failure to support Chamberlain in his 3 p.m. attack.  Nor do I have a problem with the possibility that Sweitzer fought at a position that could be considered near the future site of the Crater.  But whatever the truth is about “high water marks,” the 155th’s testimony offers absolutely nothing regarding where Chamberlain and his brigade were positioned on June 18th.  Rasbach’s assertion here that Sweitzer could not have done the wonderful things he did on June 18th if Chamberlain had not been with him is nonsensical and completed unsupported by the evidence he offers.
On Rasbach’s p. 159, a map illustrates how, when Rasbach and Bryce Suderow, unbeknownst to any other interested parties, petitioned the Virginia Department of Historic Resources (the people who install roadside historical markers) to move a recently erected marker commemorating Chamberlain’s June 18 assault at Petersburg.  This agency accepted Rasbach and Suderow’s assertion that JLC didn’t know where he was on June 18th, and actually fought from 1 to 1.5 miles further to right on the Federal line.  With no consultation of other historians, including the ones who were consulted on the marker’s original placement, the agency made the decision to move the marker to where Rasbach and Suderow claimed Chamberlain and his 1st Brigade fought at Petersburg, and the agency then refused to consider any other evidence to the contrary.  Rasbach and Suderow have made much of their success at having the marker moved, utilizing it as a publicity coup for their upcoming book.  I reiterate my own feelings regarding the moving of the roadside marker.  It really matters little to me where the marker is in Petersburg’s urban environment.  But I am greatly troubled by the unwarranted assault on Joshua Chamberlain’s record and veracity.
If there’s any lingering doubt about how Rasbach feels about Chamberlain, despite his assurance that he admires JLC and has no wish to damage his reputation, it can be found here in Rasbach’s statement that he has disproved and countered the accounts that “perpetuated the myth that Chamberlain was operating isolated and alone.”  Rasbach thereby leaves us with very few alternatives regarding JLC and his brigade at the Battle of Petersburg on June 18th.  Here are your choices:  Rasbach would have us believe that the young Chamberlain was a combat-adled soldier, or, if you prefer, you can choose the senile and forgetful aged Chamberlain.  Or, as Rasbach’s suggests, you can see, as Rasbach does, that Chamberlain’s accounts are nothing more than exaggerated attempts at self-aggrandizement, or, to put it another way, Chamberlain lied.  None of these options offered by Rasbach can, by any stretch of the imagination, be intended to inspire admiration for Chamberlain or his 1st Brigade at Petersburg, nor honor their memory.
When finished assaulting JLC’s record and character, Rasbach goes to work on page 160-161 on all other Chamberlain historians who, Rasbach would have us believe, because of their careless, sloppy research, their gullibility and/or their failure to share material with one another, failed to come to the same conclusions that Rasbach did.  I can assure the reader that there is not one item of relevant evidence that Rasbach has presented here that I hadn’t seen and considered.  I’ll also share this. In the year prior to Rasbach’s publication, my husband Ned, who is also a Civil War historian, and I had frequent contact with Rasbach, and we made an honest effort to assist him with his research.  But we ended the exchange when it became obvious to us that Rasbach didn’t seem to want to see or hear about any evidence that didn’t fit his theories.  When it became clear that he hadn’t bothered to read or consider the long list of resources presented in my book, Chamberlain at Petersburg, but nonetheless wanted to argue about them, we stopped communicating with him.  So much for sharing.

Pp.  163-173
Rasbach instructs us that you cannot understand the battle if you do not walk the ground as he did.  It is indeed an interesting experience to explore today’s urban Petersburg landscape with an eye to the area’s tumultuous past, though, apparently, it can also become a misleading experience if you aren’t cautious.  Rasbach parades his list of experts before us, such as the NPS cultural resource officer and archaelogist, Julia Steele – she who found the “rare” Tyler farm icehouse which Rasbach insists must be the one referred to by Chamberlain.  See my notes for Rasbach’s pp. 53-60 for my evidence that icehouses were not rare in Virginia, which makes Rasbach’s claim that the structure believed to be an icehouse that Steele uncovered on the Taylor farm must be the icehouse JLC referred to on the June 18th battlefield.
A map and legend on pp. 164-165 shows modern day Petersburg, and its purpose is to show original location of a roadside historical marker in the vicinity of Rives’ Salient, and the new location that Rasbach and his mentor Suderow had it moved to 1.5 miles away at the Crater.  See my notes for Rasbach’s pp. 153-161 for the details of the surreptitious moving of the Chamberlain marker.  Rasbach writes about the substantial amount of time he spent at the latter site, though the observations he made and the photographs he provides are of no assistance in clarifying or proving anything.  Meanwhile, the ground where Rives’ Salient and Ft. Hell stood was obliterated to create a housing development, and additionally contains the site of an abandoned shopping center, which was bulldozed and is now occupied, at least in part, by a church and its large parking lot.

Pp. 174-176
Rasbach’s “Afterword,” entitled “A Monument to a Myth No More,” is another repetition of the author’s insistence that he has shown “proof” that Chamberlain didn’t know where he was on June 18th, and didn’t do what he said he did.  Rasbach believes, but doesn’t successfully prove, in my informed opinion, due to flawed research and even worse attempts at reasoning, that no man, including Chamberlain, could have done what he said he did on June 18th.  Why’s that?  With a wild flight of convoluted logic, Rasbach actually acknowledges the fact that there was no comparison between a formidable Dimmock line fortification, like Rives’ Salient, and the feeble earthworks on the brand new Harris line.  It was a difference that any idiot, let alone an intelligent experienced veteran like Chamberlain could have seen for himself.  So, Rasbach therefore insists that it must be true that JLC assaulted a knee high lump of earth, and made up the part about assaulting a strong well-manned fortification.  Rasbach’s statement can only be interpreted in one way.  According to Rasbach, Chamberlain was a liar, and apparently trusted to luck that his entire brigade, and any other witnesses, would go along with his lie.
I need to state that the Chamberlain I have come to know through years of research and writing, is not a liar, but a careful and honest historian, and, for that matter, so am I.  Rasbach goes on in his summing up to again beat his, “We got the marker moved” drum, listing all those historians and researchers and employees of the historic marker agency who agreed with him.  He also describes the “wail of protest” which arose from those historians disagree, and were taken completely by surprise regarding the success of Rasbach’s and Suderow’s covert activities to move the marker.  I personally don’t really care where a small roadside plaque resides in urban Petersburg, but I mind very much what I see as an unwarranted and poorly defended attack on Chamberlain’s veracity and reputation.  In addition, Rasbach has chosen to denigrate the work of other researchers and historians, myself included, instead of engaging in a civil debate, the offering of legitimate evidence and a reasonable dialogue.

Pp. 184-187
Rasbach Appendix 2 is entitled, “Chamberlain’s Wound, its Treatment and Civil War Medicine.”
While Rasbach is a surgeon, his description of the exact damage done by the minie ball that went through JLC’s pelvis is disputed by other well qualified physicians.  I’ll personally always be grateful to my friend Dr. George Files, a urologist/surgeon who took a great interest in Chamberlain’s medical history, and could give what evidence was available on JLC’s wound, with its subsequent treatment and the suffering he endured, the attention it deserved.  Dr. Files’ findings allowed me and others to realize that JLC’s wound was more terrible than I and other laymen could realize.  One thing I valued about Dr. Files’ informed judgements was his opinion that we would never know exactly what structures were damaged or destroyed, or what functions were lost.  A copy of Dr. Files report is available at the Pejepscot Historical Society in their Chamberlain archives.  Without being able to know for a certainty the idiosyncrasies of Chamberlain’s body, nor the exact twist of his body as he turned to urge his troops on, we should not do more than make informed conjecture.
Rasbach makes a change to JLC’s description that the surgeons at the 1st Divisions field hospital used a ramrod to probe his wound.  Where Chamberlain explained they used the rod because the wound was too “wide” for the usual probe, Rasbach alters it to read “too [long].”  It is debatable, I suppose, whether Chamberlain meant wide in reference to the diameter of the hole the minie ball’s pathway cut through him, or whether JLC was describing the length of the path of the bullet from his right hip to his left. But what is clear is that no ordinary bullet probe was adequate to probe the wound that Chamberlain suffered.  One of the articles Rasbach refers to, Harmon and McAllister’s “Lion of the Union,” in the March, 2000, Journal of Urology, describes how wide minie ball wounds were, so JLC was likely referring to the diameter of the path the ball cut through him.  A startling side bar in this article suggests, though what if any evidence is being cited or considered is unclear, that Chamberlain suffered from “Civil War illness syndrome” after Gettysburg, which the authors inform us is the equivalent of post-traumatic stress disorder.  Harmon and McAllister, acknowledge that Chamberlain also had what was diagnosed as typhoid-malarial fever at the time, and, FYI, he was unconscious by the time he was sent to a Washington hospital.  But nonetheless this doctor duo offer their PTSD diagnosis, and it’s one I’m not entirely comfortable with.  I get uneasy with anything that approaches psychoanlaysis of anyone not currently alive.  Nor do I know the reasoning or evidence behind the authors’ stated “richochet” theory, nor their mention of morphine and chloroform sedation, though the authors do admit that JLC was awake enough to encourage his surgeons to keep trying to either stop the sufferer from bleeding out, or controlling the destructive flow of urine, whichever theory the evidence suggests to you.  Also I have no idea where they got the idea that JLC had TB.  All in all, this is a topsy-turvy eccentric article without the archival material to back it up.
I most definitely prefer my medical conjecture to be considerably more carefully and conservatively considered, for besides the above, Rasbach also cites Josh Knight’s article, “Pelvis Under Fire: Urological Injuries during the American Civil War,” which is available online.  Rasbach seemingly sees this article as evidence that the wound Chamberlain received at Petersburg wasn’t anything unusual, and too much has been made of its severity and JLC’s ability to survive it.  But while Rasbach quotes Knight’s data that 79% of the soldiers with urethral gunshot wounds survived, Rasbach doesn’t bother to include Knight’s caveat that that the 79% who survived in these cases is describing the percentage of the patients who didn’t die during the operation and managed to at least make it off the operating table.  Then too, Rasbach, in quoting this article with it’s limited reference to damage only to the urethra, gives no consideration to the other structures damaged within Chamberlain’s body during the ball’s hip to hip passage through his abdomen.

Pp. 188-194
Rasbach’s Appendix 3 “Maps and Chamberlain’s Story at Petersburg.” Rasbach reproduces a small portion of J.F. Gilmer’s map of 1863 that shows some of the contours and elevations that existed a year before the Army of the Potomac’s Battle at Petersburg and subsequent siege.  The reproduction of W.H. Stevens’ map of the post battle siege lines that we are given is nearly illegible, even with a magnifying glass.  Michler’s post battle map [July through September, 1864] on p. 191 is similarly nearly impossible to read.  Though Rasbach assures us of the amazing accuracy of the latest high tech imaging, I’ll be darned if I know just what the LIDAR of today’s Petersburg National Battlefield is supposed to reveal to us that would impact upon Chamberlain position at 3 p.m. on June 18, 1864.  And, though Rasbach touts the great details that 1865 “Manuscript Michler,” none of that detail is decipherable in the tiny, poor quality reproduction on p. 193.
Rasbach describes his “Eureka” moment when studying the 1865 Michler map and comparing it to the LIDAR, and it may be a possibile explanation as to why Rasbach is unaware of the existence of a branch of Poor Creek in front of Rives’ Salient on June 18, 1864, a detail that Rasbach denies, but which is clearly visible on period maps from the time of the battle, and, in fact, is still there.  Instead, Rasbach’s map work apparently led him to adopt the theory that only that area in front of the future site of the Crater matched Chamberlain’s descriptive details of where he and 1st Brigade attacked at 3 p.m. on June 18th.  It may have been “Eureka,” but it was, in my opinion, a fatal error for Rasbach’s theories.  Rasbach’s last map, on p. 194, displays the 1865 Michler map overlain on the LIDAR map showing us only the area around Elliot’s Salient where Rasbach insists JLC and the 1st Brigade made their assault.  We’re assured that Rasbach’s maps, much like his research and writing, are “hyper-accurate.”
Meanwhile, Rasbach assures us that the topography where he thinks JLC attacked hasn’t changed much in 150 or so years, and that may be somewhat true of the area known as the Crater.  But I’ll again mention that Rives’ Salient, where Chamberlain and many others place the 1st Brigade during their attack, is now graced with a housing development, and, the shopping center that was once there is now a church and a large parking lot.  All in all quite a dramatic change from the battlefield where JLC came near losing his life and a good many of his soldiers lost theirs in this, one of the last futile and costly frontal assaults of U.S. Grant’s Overland Campaign. We can likely assume that Hal Jespersen’s mapmaking efforts were based upon material provided to him by the author Rasbach, who refers to Jespersen as his “patient and longsuffering [sic] obedient servant.”